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ThisArticle documents the story behind and the complex origins ofthe Limited
Liability Company (LLC). Using unpublished letters, memoranda, and other
documents, this Article shows the inside story of the interest group activity
responsible for inventing the first LLC statute in 1977, the initial battle fought by
the early LLC proponents to secure partnership classfication from the Internal
Revenue Service, and the organized efforts of LLC proponents in the 1990s
lobbying the IRS for more favorable partnership classification rules, while
encouraging the states to enact statutes. Professor Hamill offers a unique
perspective on the story of the LLC through her experience as an attorney with the
Chief Counsel's Office of the Internal Revenue Service (from 1990-1994) during
many of the events described in the Article.
This Article also offers insights into the origins of the LLC by analyzing how
certain business and tax dynamics came together, resulting in the LLC entering into
the American landscape Focusing on the historical evolution of corporations, this
Article traces the LLC's earliest origins to the first few decades of the nineteenth
century when state law power over the incorporation process cemented. Focusing
on the twentieth century, this Article identifies first the modern income tax of 1913
as the LLC's modern origin, and then explores how the effective income tax burden
of doing business in the corporate versus partnership forms and how the
development of the market for investments in independent oil and gas drilling
ventures greatly affected the timing of the LLC's invention in the 1970s. An
explanation of the LLC's rise to prominence in the 1990s concludes this Article.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Wyoming Limited Liability Company (LLC), created in 1977,1 represents
the first domestic unincorporated business entity combining statutory limited
liability protection with the ability to be taxed as a partnership for federal income
tax purposes.2 The LLC's creation and its swift acceptance as a mainstream
business choice directly resulted from the radically different tax regimes imposed
on corporations and partnerships.3 The partnership tax provisions only impose one
level of tax at the owner level and offer a number of other advantages, including the
ability to flexibly allocate profits and losses. The corporate tax provisions, generally
regarded as inferior, either require all corporations to bear two levels of tax, once
at the entity level and again at the shareholder level, or allow S corporations a flow-
through regime with many restrictions not faced by partnerships.4 Corporations
never qualify for partnership taxation5 and before the LLC's invention, corporations
were the only domestic business entity offering complete statutory limited liability.
After the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) formally recognized the LLC's ability
to be taxed as a partnership in 1988, interest in LLCs grew exponentially. By the
close of 1996, all fifty states and the District of Columbia had passed statutes
allowing formation of LLCs within their jurisdictions. In less than twenty years-a
I Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 158, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws 537 (enacted
March 4, 1977) (codified at WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-15-101-17-15-144 (Michie 1997)).
2 See Frank M. Burke & John S. Sessions, The Wyoming Limited Liability Company: An
Alternative to Sub S andLimited Partnerships?, 54 J. TAX'N 232-35 (1981); Susan Pace Hamill,
The LimitedLiability Company: A Possible Choice ForDoing Business?, 41 U. FLA. L. REV. 721
(1989) [hereinafter Hamill, Possible Choice] (early articles exploring LLCs).
3 See Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Catalyst Exposing the Corporate
Integration Question, 95 MICH. L. REV. 393, 399-410 (1996) [hereinafter Hamill, Corporate
Integration].
4 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 701-761 (1994) (partnership tax rules); 26 U.S.C. §§ 301-385 (West
1988 & Supp. 1998) (corporate tax rules); 26 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1399 (1994 & Supp. I 1996)
(subchapter S rules); Hamill, Possible Choice, supra note 2, at 748-57 (tax advantages of
partnerships compared with the disadvantages of S corporations); Hanrill, Corporate Integration,
supra note 3, at 407-09 (1996 legislation fails to equalize LLCs and S corporations); infra note
221 (enactment and amendments of subchapter S).
5 See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(2) (1994) (definition of partnership excludes all corporations); LR.C.
§ 7701(a)(3) (1994) (definition of corporations includes all corporations); see also Gen. Couns.
Mem. 37, 953 (May 14, 1979) (citing Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 518 (1819); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 79-21-084 (Feb. 27, 1979) (incorporation under state law
results inperse corporate taxation regardless of the corporation's business characteristics); Gen.
Couns. Mem. 37, 127 (May 18, 1977) (same); Hamill, Corporate Integration, supra note 3, at 397
n.20 (same); Susan Pace Hamill, The Taxation of Domestic Limited Liability Companies and
Limited Partnerships: A Case For Eliminating the Partnership Classification Regulations, 73
WASH. U. L. Q. 565, 598-99 (1995) [hereinafter Hamill, Partnership Classification] (same).
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meteoric pace unprecedented in the development of business organizations-this
new business form grew from obscurity to a viable new alternative for doing
business. Although superficially appearing to be an impermissible end run around
the federal corporate income tax, in fact LLCs impose no material threat to these
revenues.6 Tnstead, the invention of the LLC exemplifies the states responding to the
inequities and distortions of the current federal business tax system. The power of
the states, rather than of the federal government, to sanction the formation of
business organizations made the rise of the LLC possible.
The invention of the LLC as a legitimate choice for doing business represents
a new solution to an old problem. The debate addressing the wisdom of the two-tier
tax imposed on corporations, known as the corporate integration issue, started many
years before the LLC's creation. Moreover, the entity-level tax imposed on
corporations and on those unincorporated forms similar to corporations, as
compared to a flow-through regime for partnerships, has existed since 1913-the
year Congress enacted the modem federal income tax. At the time of the LLC's
birth in 1977 and throughout its entire first phase of development ending in late
1996, the partnership classification regulations, a set of federal rules administered
by the IRS, imposed certain requirements on all unincorporated business
organizations, including LLCs, seeking the benefits of partnership taxation.7 The
LLC's battle to emerge as an independent, viable alternative for doing business
revolved around convincing the IRS that it met the partnership classification
requirements. The combination of the tenacity of the organized LLC proponents
lobbying the IRS and the absence of organized opposition produced a successful
outcome.
Using numerous unpublished reports and memoranda, this Article details the
efforts to secure legitimacy for the LLC and then explores the LLC's historical
origins8 in order to gain a broader perspective on the circumstances leading to the
emergence of this new American business organization. Part II identifies two
separate groups of LLC proponents, marking the IRS's recognition of the LLC's
right to be taxed as a partnership in 1988 as the turning point in the LLC's
development. In the mid 1970s, a few entrepreneurial-minded attorneys and
accountants representing a U.S. independent oil and gas company invented the LLC,
successfully persuaded the Wyoming legislature in 1977 to enact the first LLC
statute, and asked the IRS to grant the new LLC favorable partnership status. The
ensuing struggle, in which the IRS refused to acknowledge the LLC's partnership
6 See generally Hamill, Corporate Integration, supra note 3.
7 See Hamill, Partnership Classification, supra note 5.
8 "The rational study of law is still to a large extent the study of history. History must be a
part of the study, because without it we cannot know the precise scope of rules which it is our
business to know." Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 469
(1897).
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status despite its literal compliance with the partnership classification regulations,
forced the IRS to directly confront the effect of statutory limited liability on the
ability to qualify for partnership taxation. Part II then outlines the events that
occurred during the 1990s as the LLC developed as a mainstream choice for doing
business. A second group of LLC proponents lobbied the IRS to liberalize the
partnership classification requirements so that, on a practical level, more businesses
could use LLCs. These efforts accelerated the state statutory enactments, which in
turn led to the IRS removing all barriers holding the LLC back by granting all
domestic unincorporated businesses automatic partnership taxation.9
Part m' explores the LLC's historical origins back to America's first few
decades as the state and federal components of the new nation struggled to define
their spheres of power. Because a federally based system of creating business
organizations would have prevented the LLC's birth, its earliest origin can be traced
back to the cementing of state power over the creation of corporations, the first
American business organization requiring formal governmental recognition
embodied in the corporate charter. Although Congress chartered two national banks
in the late eighteenth century and contemplated a nationally planned transportation
system in the early nineteenth century, federal control never played a prominent role
in the earliest days of the American corporation, implicitly leaving the power to
grant corporate charters with the individual states. Although criticism directed at the
corporation mounted in the decades leading up to the Civil War, the wrath focused
on the federally chartered Bank of the United States and the process of incorporation
by special charter rather than the individual states' general authority over the
corporation. Ultimately, the state-law-based corporation survived through the
invention of general incorporation statutes during the late 1830s and 1840s. By the
eve of the Civil War, general incorporation statutes were proliferating across the
states, firmly cementing the primary power over the corporation with the states. By
the early twentieth century, when lawmakers seriously discussed moving the
incorporation process into the federal domain, the custom of incorporation under
state statutes proved impossible to change.
From a tax and business angle, Part IV explains why the LLC first appeared in
the 1970s and discusses the business interests generating the enthusiastic push for
LLCs in the 1990s. Although the corporate tax theoretically set the stage in 1913,
no safe path existed for the LLC's invention until 1960, the year the partnership
classification regulations first allowed entities with statutory limited liability to
9 The author of this Article, Susan Pace Hamill, served as an attorney advisor from May 1990
to May 1994 in the Division of Passthroughs & Special Industries (which has subject jurisdiction
over partnerships and LLCs) of the ChiefCounsel's Office of the IRS in Washington D.C. As part
of this employment, the author participated directly in, or had first hand knowledge of, many of
the events described in this Article. Special effort has been made to portray these events in an
impartial and scholarly manner.
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qualify for partnership taxation. Moreover, actual income tax burdens faced by
businesses using partnerships and corporations, which for the most part materially
favored corporations, explain why businesses consistently producing taxable
income had no motivation to invent or support the LLC until after the Tax Reform
Act of 1986.10 Starting in the late 1960s, the increased presence of independent oil
explorers and their desire to combine limited liability with the partnership's ability
to pass-through tax losses to investors, best explains why it took until the mid 1970s
to invent the LLC. By the time the LLC secured partnership status in 1988, changes
made by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 eliminated the ability of most investors to
utilize flow-through tax losses and materially increased the tax burden on corporate
income. Thus, business ventures expecting to consistently recognize taxable income
supported LLCs in the 1990s.
HI. THE STORY OF THE LLC
A. The LLC's Birth and Initial Fightfor Survival
The explanation behind the LLC's birth boils down to innovative professionals
creating solutions when the current legal system fails to meet client needs.11 The
particular client whose needs sparked the invention of the LLC was an independent
oil explorer experiencing increased opportunities in international oil and gas
exploration during the turbulent 1970s, 'when the major producers struggled with
problems related to the middle eastern oil supply.12 In 1975, Frank M. Burke, and
others representing the Hamilton Brothers Oil Company, which is headquartered in
Denver, Colorado, attempted to persuade the Alaska State Legislature to enact the
first domestic LLC statute and identified favorable partnership tax classification
from the IRS as holding critical importance. 13 Since the late 1960s, Hamilton
Brothers Oil Company had been involved in international oil and gas exploration
using foreign LLCs, primarily the Panamanian limitada. Unlike the U.S. entities
available at that time, limitadas provided direct limited liability and the ability to
secure partnership classification for U.S. income tax purposes. 14
10 Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
11 See generally DANIFL A. FARBER & PHI.IP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHoICE 12-37
(1991) (discussing the influence of interest groups on legislation).
12 See infra notes 243-46 and accompanying text; see also William . Camey, Limited
Liability Companies: Origins and Antecedents, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 855 (1995) (extensive
discussion of the foreign limitada antecedents of LLCs).
13 See infra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
14 Hamilton Brothers Oil Company considered using Brazilian limitadas, which received
partnership taxation despite having limited liability, as the vehicle for the exploration ventures. See
Priv. Ltr. Rul. T:I1:2:2 (Jan. 30, 1970). However, certain features of the Brazilian law rendered that
14631998]
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The Hamilton Brothers Oil Company soon found that Panamanian limitadas
posed administrative difficulties, and because no similar entity existed in the U.S.,
these limitadas also created uncertainty concerning the degree that U.S. courts
would respect the limited liability characteristic. 15 Because no viable domestic
entity existed, like the foreign limitada, which combined limited liability and
partnership taxation, 16 the representatives of Hamilton Brothers Oil Company
created an unincorporated domestic entity resembling the foreign limitada. This new
entity met the literal requirements of the partnership classification rules while
providing direct limited liability protection for all participants. 17 The newly created
LLC, presented to the Alaska legislature on April 8, 1975, offered for the first
time18 the potential for a domestic entity to combine the tax advantages of a
partnership with direct limited liability commonly associated with corporations. The
sponsors understood that the Alaska bill posed a major breakthrough for U.S.
forum unsatisfactory for Hamilton Brothers Oil Company's needs, causing them to routinely use
Panamanian limitadas. See Letter from Frank M. Burke to . Richard Emens of Moyer, Tingley,
Hurd & Emens (Nov. 4, 1972) (on file with author). Panamanian limitadas also received favorable
partnership classification rulings. See Priv. Lir. Rul. T:I.I:2:2 (Feb. 15, 1973) (on file with author);
Priv. Ltr. Rul. T:I:I:2:4, at 2-3 (Dec. 30, 1974) (on file with author); Priv. Ltr. Rul. T:I:I:2:2 (Apr.
5, 1974) (on file with author); Letter from Frank M. Burke to J.W. Bullion of Thompson, Knight,
Simmons, & Bullion (Apr. 1, 1974) (on file with author) (describing a number of Panamanian
limitada rulings in process).
15 See Letter from Frank M. Burke to Claude Dodgen, Texas Pacific Oil Company (Aug. 30,
1973) (on file with author) (Panamanian limitadas cannot receive more than $500,000 of capital
and quota holders must be individuals); Letter from Frank M. Burke to Thomas E. Jenks of Lee,
Toomey & Kent (Feb. 16, 1974) (on file with author) (same); Internal Distribution Memorandum
from N.B. Glenn of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell, & Co. (Mar. 16, 1977) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Mar. 16,1977 Memo] (Wyoming LLC eliminates substantial administrative burdens);
Request for Ruling on the Partnership Status of Wyoming Limited Liability Company from Frank
M. Burke to Commissioner ofIRS (May 20, 1977) (on file with author) [hereinafter May 20, 1977
Ruling Request] (burdensome capital and quota holder restrictions of the Panamanian limitada
overcome by the Wyoming LLC).
16 Due to the high risk and speculative nature of their investments, Hamilton Brothers Oil
Company's clients needed a flow-through entity to provide one level of tax and limited liability.
See Letter from AJ. Miller, Executive Vice President, Hamilton Brothers Oil Company, to Walter
Urbigldt, Chief Justice, Wyoming Supreme Court (June 5, 1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter
June 5, 1992 Letter]; Open Letter By Frank M. Burke (March 25, 1993) (on file with author).
17 See June 5, 1992 Letter, supra note 16, at 1 ("Frank Burke... drafted the terms of the
original proposal."); see also Request for Information Letter from Frank M. Burke to Lawrence
B. Gibbs, Assistant Comm'r, IRS, at 3-5 (May 1, 1975) (on file with author) [hereinafter May 1,
1975 Letter] (requesting partnership classification of Alaska LLC while legislation pending).
18 See infra notes 205-08 and accompanying text (discussion of early partnership
associations and their inability to secure partnership classification before 1960); see also Hamill,
Possible Choice, supra note 2, at 722 n.9 (discussing business problems with later partnership
associations).
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business organizations and would likely be scrutinized as very tax-sensitive.1 9 After
much debate and effort and two attempts, once in April of 197520 and once in April
of 1976,21 the Alaska bills died, apparently for political reasons unrelated to the
proposals.22
Shortly after the failed legislative effort in Alaska, Hamilton Brothers Oil
Company's advisors took an identical LLC bill to Wyoming and apparently secured
enactment on March 4, 1977 without any struggle.23 This success in Wyoming
experienced by the first group of LLC proponents can be explained by the group's
19 See Letter from Miles S. Scblosberg to Robert Bradley, Chair of the House Commerce
Committee, Alaska Legislature (May 5, 1975) (on file with author) (identifies IRS tax
classification as important consideration). The sponsors of the Alaska bill sought guidance from
the IRS. See Letters from Bob Bradley & Jalmar Kerttula, Alaska Legislature, to Lawrence Gibbs,
Assistant Comm'r (Technical), IRS (Apr. 30, 1975) (on file with author) (information letters
seeking partnership classification for the pending Alaska LLC legislation); see also Letter from
Billy M. Hargett, Chief, Individual Income Branch, IRS, to Frank M. Burke (May 12, 1975) (on
file with author) (IRS will only consider ruling after proposed legislation becomes final).
20 See H.B. 403 (introduced by Rep. Richard K. Urion on Apr. 9, 1975); S.B. 354,9th Leg.,
1st Sess. (Alaska 1975) (introduced by Sen. Mike Colletta on Apr. 8, 1975); see also Letters from
Robert L. Hartig of Cole, Hertig, Rhodes, Norman, Mahoney & Goltz, to Jim Parker, Hamilton
Brothers Oil Company (May 9, 1975 & Apr. 18, 1975) (on file with author); Letter from Robert
L. Hartig to Richard W. Coates, Hamilton Brothers Oil Company (Mar. 18, 1975) (on file with
author) (describing efforts to marshal support for the Alaska LLC legislation).
21 See Letter from Bernard Dougherty of Cole, Hortig, Norman, Mahoney & Goltz, to
Richard Coates, Esq., Hamilton Brothers Oil Company (Apr. 29, 1976) (on file with author)
(referring to hearings on the Alaska LLC proposed legislation held before the House Commerce
Committee on Apr. 27, 1976); Letter from Bernard Dougherty to Frank M. Burke (Mar. 26,1976)
(on file with author) (proposed LLC legislation passed the Alaska Senate 14-4, but was delayed
in the House Commerce Committee); S. 9, 2d Leg. Sess., Senate Journal, at 355 (1976) (on file
with author) (discussion of proposed LLC legislation states that a favorable ruling from the IRS
is important and refers to potential fees Alaska might derive, drawing an analogy to Delaware's
experience with corporation filings).
2 2 See Letter from R.L. Butts to Thomas N. Long (May 5, 1994) (on file with author) (the
proposal in Alaska was never considered by the legislature because it did not get out of the
committee prior to the legislature's adjournment). Apparently the sponsors supporting the
legislation expected it to go through. See Letter from Frank M. Burke to AJ. Miller, Hamilton
Brothers Oil Company (Mar. 18, 1976) (on file with author) (circulating for comment a draft
private ruling request for the first Alaska LLC ready to be formed once the law passes).
23 See Wyoming Limited Liability Act, ch. 158, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws 537 (codified at
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-15-100-17-15-144 (Michie 1997)); Letter from Hugh M. Duncan,
Attorney, to Richard Coates, Esq., Hamilton Brothers Oil Company (Feb. 3, 1977) (on file with
author); Memorandum from J.W. Bullion to Mr. Bumett (Feb. 7, 1977); Letter from R.L. Butts,
Hamilton Brothers Oil Company, to J.W. Bullion of Thompson, Knight, Simmons & Bullion (Feb.
2, 1977) (on file with author) (circulating comments ofdraft Wyoming legislation); Memorandum
from Frank M. Burke & Paul Pommier to N.B. Glenn, (Mar. 15, 1977) (on file with author)
(describing the Wyoming legislation as identical to the Alaska version).
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high degree of organization and focus toward the goal of creating and securing the
first LLC statute for their client the Hamilton Brothers Oil Company. Although
acting as a lobby group, the lawyers and accountants advising Hamilton Brothers
Oil Company were hardly large and powerful, they faced no organized opposition
and they only had to convince the legislators of one state to accept the proposed
LLC statute. The states approached-first Alaska and then Wyoming-represent
relatively small states with informal and accessible channels to the legislature. The
combination of the tenacity of this first group of LLC proponents, the absence of
organized opposition, and the existence of informal and relatively accessible state
legislatures explains the successful lobby effort for the first LLC statute.24
However, the first group of LLC proponents would soon face a far more
powerful and less friendly obstacle before the new statute could be used by any
client. Armed with the enacted LLC legislation, the Hamilton Brothers Oil
Company, on May 25, 1977, filed a request with the IRS, the federal agency vested
with the authority to determine which unincorporated businesses avoid association
status,25 asking for a favorable partnership classification ruling. 6 The IRS, reluctant
to allow a domestic entity27 with corporate limited liability partnership
classification, predictably stalled the ruling process. After a great deal of
correspondence between Hamilton Brothers Oil Company's representatives and the
IRS, 28 an additional request for a ruling filed by the Wyoming Secretary of State
24 See generally FARBR& FRICKEYsupra note 11, at 23, 37,72, 141-42, 146. Alaska and
Wyoming are not the only states with more easily accessible legislatures. Perhaps the state political
position favoring major versus smaller oil producers factored into the choice of forum to receive
the first LLC statute. Under this theory, states like Alaska and Wyoming presumably generated
more support for smaller producers, while other states like Oklahoma and Louisiana generated
more support for major oil producers.
2 5 See I.RC. § 7805 (1997) (IRS general rulemaking authority); see also Hamill, Partnership
Classification, supra note 5, at 569 n.15 (discussing the IRS's general authority over the
partnership classification area).
2 6 See May 20, 1977 Ruling Request, supra note 15; Memorandum from RE. Holloway to
Frank M. Burke (May 25, 1977) (on file with author) (confirming the filing of the ruling).
2 7 See Hamill, Corporate Integration, supra note 3, at 402 n.42 (IRS had issued favorable
partnership classification regulations to foreign limitadas offering limited liability since the 1970s);
supra note 14 (Brazilian and Panamanian limitadas offering limited liability protection, used by
Hamilton Brothers Oil Company, received favorable partnership classification rulings in the
1970s).
2 8 See Letter from Frank M. Burke to Bob Butts, Hamilton Brothers Oil Company (Sept 22,
1977) (on file with author) (draft favorable ruling by next week); Letter from Frank M. Burke to
A.. Miller (Nov. 21, 1977) (on file with author) (IRS getting close to handling the case); Letter
from Frank M. Burke to A. J. Miller (July 6, 1978) (on file with author) ("Without some outside
encouragement, our ruling could be hung-up in the Chief Counsel's office for months."); Letter
from Frank M. Burke to A. J. Miller (Sept. 28,1978) (on file with author) ("Obviously the normal
channels do not provide us an adequate means of expediting the ruling."); Letter from Frank M.
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and supported by the Governor,29 as well as another correspondence involving the
Commissioner of the IRS and Wyoming Senators,30 the IRS finally issued a
favorable private letter ruling to Hamilton Brothers Oil Company regarding its
Wyoming LLC on November 18, 1980,31 more than three years after the initial
request.3
2
Also in 1980, on the eve of the private letter ruling's release, the IRS issued
proposed amendments to the partnership classification regulations that would
automatically tax all limited liability companies as corporations, revealing the
Burke to AJ. Miller (Jan. 15, 1979) (on file with author) (ruling available soon, but no indication
ofresult); Letter from Frank M. Burke to Jerome Kurtz, Commissioner of IRS (July 20, 1979) (on
file with author) (no justification for two-year delay, asking for resolution as soon as possible);
Memorandum from Philip Wiesner to Frank M. Burke (Sept. 10, 1979) (on file with author)
(public revenue ruling will be issued with the private letter ruling; IRS's present position believed
to be favorable); Memorandum from Philip Wiesner to Frank M. Burke (Nov. 2, 1979) (on file
with author) (private ruling held up while public ruling being reviewed); Memorandum from
Philip Wiesner to Frank M. Burke (Nov. 21, 1979) (on file with author) (proposed revenue ruling
has been pulled from list to be published); Memorandum from Philip Wiesner to Frank M. Burke
(Dec. 17, 1979) (on file with author) (proposed revenue ruling not receiving priority attention);
Memorandum from Philip Wiesner to Frank M. Burke (May 2, 1980) (on file with author) (no
change in status); Memorandum from Philip Wiesner to Frank M. Burke (June 6, 1980) (on file
with author) (virtually all issues resolved but no indication of outcome); Memorandum from Philip
Wiesner to Frank M. Burke (June 24, 1980) (on file with author) (published ruling forthcoming);
Memorandum from Philip Wiesner to Frank M. Burke (July 9,1980) (on file with author) (no final
deadline for a decision). Letter from Hugh Duncan, Attorney, to Richard Coates, Esq., Hamilton
Brothers Oil Company (Feb. 21, 1980) (on file with author) (reasons for delay include "the usual
buck passing... three month period before a successor was named.., difficulty of question ').
2 9 The Wyoming Secretary of State initially issued press releases praising the LLC, but
cautioning that it cannot be widely used without favorable partnership classification from the IRS.
See Letter from Hugh Duncan, Attorney, to Frank M. Burke (Feb. 17,1978) (on file with author).
Later the Wyoming Secretary of State requested a ruling on behalf of her state to clarify the tax
status of Wyoming LLCs, which was later supported by the Governor ofWyoring, Ed Herschler.
See Request for Ruling to IRS from Thyra Thomson, Wyoming Secretary of State, to John L.
Withers, Assistant Cornm'r, IRS (Oct. 2, 1978) (on file with author); Letter from Wyoming
Governor Ed Herschler to Comm'r ofIRS (Oct. 30, 1978) (on file with author). Secretary of State
Thomson was told that the pending published revenue ruling would clarify the tax status of
Wyoming LLCs. See Letter to The Honorable Mrs. Thyra Thomson from Mario Lombardo,
Acting Director, Individual Tax Division, IRS (Nov. 14, 1978) (on file with author).
3 0 Letters from Clifford P. Hansen, U.S. Sen., to Jerome Kurtz, Comm'r of IRS (Oct. 26,
1978) (on file with author); Letter from Malcolm Wallop, U.S. Sen., to Jerome Kurtz, Comm'r of
IRS (Nov. 3, 1978) (on file with author) (urging a quick resolution of the ruling request sent by
the Wyoming Secretary of State); Letter from John A. Withers, Ass't Comm'r (Technical) IRS,
to Sen. Hansen (Nov. 14, 1978) (ruling will not be issued directly to the state; every effort being
made to publish a general revenue ruling).
31 See Priv. Lir. Rul. 8106082 (Nov. 18, 1980).
3 2 See May 20, 1977 Ruling Request, supra note 15.
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conflicting views that undoubtedly existed among IRS officials.33 Although clearly
devastating to the Wyoming LLC,34 the proposed regulations received the strongest
criticism from representatives of equipment leasing trusts and U.S. persons
participating in foreign enterprises, who had received favorable partnership
classification despite having limited liability protection.35 Despite the firestorm
33 See 45 Fed. Reg. 75,709-75,710 (1980) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301); see also Hamill,
Partnership Classification, supra note 5, at 576, 580 (discussion of the 1980 proposed
regulations).
34 See Peat, Marwick Calls for Withdrawal of Proposed Regulations on Limited Liability
Companies, 13 TAX NOTES (1981) (Frank M. Burke, the principal author, urging the withdrawal
of the regulations as an improper interpretation ofjudicial and administrative precedents); see also
Letter from Frank M. Burke to Hugh Duncan, Attorney, at 1 (Dec. 2,1980) (on file with author)
("[The regulation] would have a substantial adverse impact on the Wyoming Limited Liability
Company Act.").
35 See I.R.S. News Release IR-82-145 (Dec. 16, 1982). The 1980 regulations spawned a
firestorm of criticism. See Leasing Indusby Opposes Proposed Regulations on Grantor Trusts,
12 TAX NOTES 168 (1981) (excerpt from comments by Bernard J. McKenna, American
Association of Equipment Lessors; major departure from long-established tax rules); Effect of
ProposedAmendments on "Leasing Trusts" Deplored, 12 TAX NOTES 288 (1981) (summary of
comments from Harry E. White of Millbank Tweed, Hadley & McCoy, greatly affect all existing
leasing trusts); id. at 288 (summary of comments from Robert 3. Casey, Attorney with Finley,
Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg & Casey; concerned about grantor trusts); id. at 288
(summary of comments from Jerry L. Oppenheimer & Robert H. Swart, attorneys for Continental
Illinois Leasing Corp.; threatens grantor trusts for multi-party equipment leases); Effect of
Proposed Amendments on Leverage Lease Financing Questioned, 12 TAX Notes 415 (1981)
(summary of comments by T.F. Quinn, V.P. American Airlines; airline industry affected); Attorney
Urges Proposed Regulations Not Be Applied to Existing Equipment Trusts, 12 TAX NOTES 415
(1981) (summary of comments from Colin E. Harley of Davis Polk & Wardwell; proposed
regulations will destroy leverage lease industry); Effect of ProposedRegulations on Leasing Trusts
is Criticized, 12 TAX NOTES 645 (1981) (summary of comments from Richard A. Crowley of
Sullivan & Cromwell; broadly apply to leasing trusts and violate established tax policies); id. at
645 (summary of comments from American Bar Association Tax Section; adverse impact on
foreign business); Taxing Leasing Partnerships as Corporations Seen to Have Serious Impact on
Leasing Industry, 14 TAX NOTES 658 (1982) (summary of comments from Leonard E. Kust &
Daniel J. Mulcahy of Caldwalader, Wickersham & Taft); Equipment Lessors SeekModifcation
ofProposed Regulations on Limited Liability Companies, 17 TAX NOTES 815 (1982) (sunmary
of comments from Michael Fleming, Director, American Association of Equipment Lessors; will
end the long-established treatment of equipment leasing trusts as partnerships); Corporations
Protest Proposed Reclassfication ofLimited Liability Organizations as "Corporations "for Tax
Purposes, 12 TAXNOTES 289 (1981) (summary of comments by David A. Brady, Dow Chemical
Company; severe hardship to foreign entities); id. at 289 (summary of comments from Robert J.
Chait, senior tax counsel for Litton Industries; seriously affect foreign organizations); Attorneys
Foresee Harmful Effect ofProposed Regulations on US. Investors Abroad, 12 TAXNOTES 415,
415-16 (1981) (summary of comments from Robert A. Aland & Frederick E. Henry of Baker &
McKenzie; severe impact on foreign business interests); Attorneys Urge Service to Scrap Proposed
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surrounding these proposed regulations, which rendered the LLC useless on a
practical level, Florida enacted an LLC statute in 1982, presumably to lure capital
into the state.36 Although the power to issue the 1980 regulations clearly fell within
the IRS's authority,37 the IRS withdrew its position in early 1983 and stated that it
would study the effect limited liability should have on entity classification. 38 That
study took over five years and predictably, while its tax status remained in limbo,
further growth in LLC legislation and businesses using LLCs stopped; no other
states enacted statutes and few businesses (less than one hundred) chose to become
LLCs.39 As long as its ability to be taxed as a partnership remained questionable,
the LLC stood no chance of expanding throughout the country.
B. The LLC's Struggle to Emerge Free oflRS Control
On September 2, 1988, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 88-76,4O a public
interpretation of the law all taxpayers can rely upon, permitting the Wyoming LLC
Regulations Making Some Partnerships Taxable as Corporations, 12 TAX NOTES 288 (1981)
(summary of comments from Tax Section of the New York State Bar Association; adverse impact
on foreign organizations and equipment leasing trusts); Attorneys Claim Proposed Regulations on
Limited Liability Companies Depart Improperlyfrom Current Law, 12 TAX NOTES 415 (1981)
(summary of comments from James F. Gordy of Miller & Chevalier;, regulations violate Morrisey
and twenty-year regulatory precedent); Accountants Urge Withdrawal of Amendments on
Classfication ofEntities as Coporations, 12 TAXNOTES 467 (1981) (summary of comments from
Arthur Young & Co.; criticizing taxing limited liability companies as corporations); Lawyers
Continue to Urge Withdrawal of Proposed Regulations on Entity Classification, 12 TAX NOTES
547 (1981) (summary of comments from David Sachs, Chairman ofthe Tax Section of the New
York State Bar Association; adverse impact on foreign interests and leasing trusts); Comments
Continue on the Effect of Proposed Regulations on Leasing Trusts, 12 TAX NOTES 960 (1981)
(summary of comments from Richard E. Murphy, Jr., Federal Tax Section of the Illinois State Bar
Association; regulations counter to the correct interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code); Peat,
Marwick Calls for Withdrawal, supra note 34, at 718 (summary of comments from Frank M.
Burke; notes that Treasury has received over 60 negative comments to proposed regulations).
36 See Florida Limited Liability Company Act, 1982 Fla. Laws ch. 82-177 (enacted Apr. 21,
1982); see also Letter from Shepard King of Steel, Hector & Davis to John S. Sessions (May 15,
1981) (describing Florida's plans to introduce LLC legislation).
37 See 26 U.S.C. § 7805 (1994 & Supp. II 1996) (IRS's general authority to issue
interpretative regulations). The Code defines corporation to include "associations" and the
Supreme Court in Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935), interpreted the term
"association" as based on resemblance to the corporation, while explicitly identifying limited
liability as a corporate characteristic. See id. at 357-60. Therefore, the IRS clearly had (and still
has) authority to tax business organizations with limited liability as corporations.
38 See Announcement 83-4, 1983-2 I.R.B. 30.
39 See Hamill, Corporate Integration, supra note 3, at 402 & n.46.
40 1988-2 C.B. 360.
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to secure partnership classification despite the presence of limited liability. By
concluding that the presence of corporate limited liability protection did not by itself
mandate corporate taxation for unincorporated entities, the IRS released its total
control over the LLC's future viability and allowed the states to realistically
consider the LLC form. The revenue ruling clearly stated that the four corporate
characteristics, continuity of life, centralized management, free transferability of
interests, and limited liability, each had equal weight. The Wyoming LLC lacked
continuity of life because the Wyoming statute triggered a potential dissolution of
the LLC upon the death, retirement, resignation, insanity, bankruptcy, or expulsion
of any member. In order to avoid an actual dissolution, all remaining members had
to agree to continue the business. The Wyoming LLC lacked free transferability of
interests because no member could transfer a complete interest, covering both
voting and economic rights without the unanimous consent of all members in the
LLC.41 Although a clear watershed in the LLC's development, the Wyoming
Revenue Ruling's requirements, rendering interests in an LLC very difficult to
transfer and the LLC itself highly dissolvable, limited the practical use of LLCs to
small, closely held businesses and joint ventures.42
After the IRS's landmark decision to recognize the LLC's right to be taxed
under the partnership provisions, the states slowly and cautiously started to enact
legislation allowing for the formation of LLCs. It took until 1990--the year
Colorado and Kansas both passed LLC statutes-for any states to step forward and
recognize the creation of LLCs in light of the IRS's revenue ruling. 3 In 1990, two
subcommittees, sponsored by the American Bar Association (ABA)-one under the
Section of Business Law and the other under the Section of Taxation-began to
study the potential of the newly available LLC.44 Despite the IRS's revenue ruling
41 See id. at 361. In addition to limited liability, the Wyoming LLC possessed centralized
management because the operating agreement designated three of the twenty-five members as
managers. The ruling failed to disclose the percentage of the LLC owned by the three managers
or discuss the possible relevance this ownership percentage might have on the LLC's ability to
lack centralized management. See also Hamill, Possible Choice, supra note 2, at 731-32 (member-
managed LLCs should lack centralized management; nanager-managed LLCs should be eligible
to lack centralized management under the same standards applicable to limited partnerships if the
managers own more than 20% of the LLC).
42 See Hamill, Possible Choice, supra note 2, at 747-48 & n.168; infra notes 45, 49.
43 See Colorado Limited Liability Act, ch. 58, 1990 Colo. Sess. Laws 414 (enacted Apr. 18,
1990); Kansas Limited Liability Act, ch. 80, 1990 Kan. Sess. Laws 585 (enacted May 11, 1990).
The lack of legal precedent and experience using LLCs probably contnuted to the states' initial
slow reaction. See Hamill, Possible Choice, supra note 2, at 744,771.
44 See General Letter from Barbara C. Spudis, Chair of LLC Subcommittee under the Section
of Taxation's Partnership Committee (July 27, 1990) (on file with author) [hereinafter July 27,
1990 Letter]; General Letter from Robert R. Keatinge, Chair of LLC Subcommittee under the
Section of Business Law's Committee on Partnerships and Unincorporated Business
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conferring partnership taxation for Wyoming LLCs, both subcommittees quickly
identified several major issues faced by LLCs when applying the detailed
mechanical web of the partnership classification regulations. 45 Although these
subcommittees spearheaded other important tasks, including the formation of a
working group to draft a prototype LLC statute,4 6 the solicitation of the Uniform
Law Commissioners to open a study project for a Uniform LLC Act,47 and the
development of a clearinghouse of information to encourage and assist state LLC
Organizations (July 12, 1990) (on file with author) [hereinafter July 12, 1990 Letter].
45 Of the seven issues on the list attached to the July 27, 1990 letter, four directly dealt with
the partnership classification regulations: (1) Could an LLC lack continuity of life if the members
contractually bound themselves to continue upon a dissolution event or if the LLC failed to state
a term of years; (2) Could the LLC lack free transferability of interests if existing members were
statutorily prohibited from unreasonably withholding consent; (3) Can a one-person LLC still
receive flow through treatment; and (4) Could an LLC receive partnership classification if the
statute was modeled after a close corporation statute. See July 27, 1990 Letter, supra note 44. One
of the issues was labeled "Procedural Issues" and questioned whether the IRS would review or rule
on draft LLC legislation to assist other states trying to enact statutes. See id. The July 12, 1990
letter identified the "progress of the revenue ruling request" as a topic for discussion. See July 12,
1990 Letter, supra note 44, at 2.
4 6 See Memorandum from Robert R. Keatinge, Stuart Levine, & Matthew P. Feeney to
Distribution List of 17 Attorneys (Dec. 12, 1990) (on file with author) (soliciting participation in
the development of a Prototype Limited Liability Company Act in order to discuss business and
tax issues and assist legislative drafters). The working group on the Prototype Limited Liability
Company Act (Matthew P. Feeney, Stuart Levine, Larry E. Ribstein, Michael L. Gravelle, Donald
J. Hess, Robert R. Keatinge, Marshall B. Paul, James W. Reynolds, Dale G. Schedler, and James
J. Wheaton) met every Saturday morning by conference call, producing numerous drafts which
culminated in a final draft on November 19, 1992. See LARRY E. RiBSTrIN & ROBERT R.
KEATINGF, RiBsTEiN & KEATiNGE ON LIMITED LIABIrIY COMPANIFs at app. B (1995).
4 7 See Letter from Robert R. Keatinge, Chair of LLC Subcommittee under the Section of
Business Law's Committee on Partnerships and Unincorporated Business Organizations, to
Richard C. Hite, Chairman, Scope and Programs Committee, National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 6-7 (Dec. 14, 1990) (on file with author) (urging study
to open a drafting project for a Uniform Limited Liability Company Act); Letter from Richard C.
Hite to Robert R. Keatinge (Dec. 27, 1990) (on file with author) (suggestion on meeting agenda);
Letter from Richard C. I-ite to Robert R. Keatinge (Feb. 19, 1991) (on file with author) (study
committee appointed); Letter from Robert R Keatinge to Edward I. Cutler of the Uniform Law
Commissioners 3 (Nov. 27, 1991) (on file with author) (urging a drafting project); Letter from
Edward I. Cutler to Dwight A. Hamilton, President National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, and Richard C. Hite and Bion M. Gregory of the Uniform Law
Commissioners 1 (Dec. 19, 1991) (on file with author) (study committee unanimously
recommends opening a drafting project); Memorandum from Dwight A. Hamilton to Edward I.
Cutler, Richard E. Ford, Harry J. Haynsworth IV, Charles G. Kepler, Wayne C. Kreuscher, Reed
L. Martineau, Richard F. Mutzebaugh, Glee E. Smith, and Howard J. Swibel 1 (May 6,1992) (on
file with author) (recipients of letter appointed to the drafting committee to produce a Uniform
LLC Act; Edward I. Cutler named Chair).
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drafting committees,48 the partnership classification issues consistently remained
at the center of their focus. 49
After much internal discussion,50 members of both subcommittees submitted
48 See General Letter from Barbara C. Spudis, Chair of LLC Subcommittee under the Section
of Taxation's Partnership Committee, to LLC Subcommittee, at 2 (Sept. 13, 1990) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Sept. 13, 1990 Letter] (acting as a clearinghouse for LLC information a task
for subcommittee; all Bar Association presidents received a LLC survey in the spring of 1990);
Letter from Barbara C. Spudis to LLC Subcommittee Members (Dec. 7, 1990) (on file author)
[hereinafter Dec. 7, 1990 Letter] (attached results of limited liability questionnaire show few states
with statutes, only a few more with pending legislation, but most expressing interest in receiving
more information); ABA Section of Taxation Subcommittee on Limited Liability Companies,
Survey ofLimited Liability Legislation (Nov. 12, 1991 update) (on file with author); ABA Section
of Taxation Subcommittee on Limited Liability Companies, Survey of Limited Liability
Legislation (July 9, 1992 update) (on file with author) [hereinafter July 9, 1992 Letter] (for each
state identifying whether an LLC law exists or has been proposed and whether there is interest in
LLC issues; includes name and address of contact person).
49 See supra notes 45,49; see also File Memorandum from John Maxfield (May 22, 1990)
(on file with author) (telephone conversation between John Maxfield, Robert Keatinge, and Tom
Hines, IRS attorney, concerning LLC partnership classification issues); Letter from Robert R.
Keatinge, Chair of LLC Subcommittee under the Section of Business Law's Committee on
Partnerships and Unincorporated Business Organizations, to Members of LLC Subcommittee, at
3 (Feb. 6, 1991) [hereinafter Feb. 6, 1991 Report] (attached minutes of Nov. 8, 1990 LLC
Business Law Section Subcommittee meeting, "several members of the subcommittee suggested
that until the transferability issue is resolved, limited liability companies will not be of much use");
Sept. 13, 1990 Letter, supra note 48 (coordination with the IRS on LLC taxation issues and
development of a position paper to address these issues are major tasks of the subcommittee);
Letter from Allan G. Donn of Willcox & Savage, to Members ofthe Joint Committee on Limited
Liability Companies of the Virginia Bar Association (Nov. 15, 1990) (on file with author). The
letter states:
Our committee will have to decide whether to recommend unanimous consent or
majority consent. The advantage of the unanimous consent requirement is that we know that
the Service will find that it is sufficient to cause the LLC to lack the corporate characteristic
of free transferability of interests. The disadvantage 'of course' is the lack of flexibility that
results. Do we want to be the pioneer in this field or do we want to take the approach that
carries with it considerable assurance of a favorable revenue ruling?
Id. at 3; see infra notes 51, 52, 57, 61, 62, 64-71, 79-86 and accompanying text.
50 See Sept. 13, 1990 Letter, supra note 48, at I (soliciting comments for November meeting
with IRS); Letter from Stuart Levine, Member of Section of Taxation's LLC Subcommittee, to
Barbara C. Spudis, Chair of LLC Subcommittee under the Section of Taxation's Partnership
Committee, at 1 (Aug. 1, 1990) (on file with author) (the issue list for the IRS November meeting
should urge that LLCs can still lack free transferability if more than two-thirds, rather than all the
members, consent to the transfer); Memorandum from Theodore Z. Gelt of Gelt, Fleishman &
Sterling, to LLC Subcommittee Members under the Section ofTaxation's Partnership Committee,
at I (Oct. 3, 1990) (on file with author) (the committee should reevaluate the issue list in order to
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to the IRS a list of tax issues posed uniquely by LLCs51 and on November 8, 1990,
met informally with IRS attorneys.52 This meeting, the first contact between
members of the private bar and the IRS to discuss LLCs in almost ten years, 53 was
destined to be one of many encounters over the next several years as LLCs grew
from obscurity to prominence. 54 At this first meeting, the partnership classification
issues dominated the discussion. Despite the existence of the Wyoming Revenue
Ruling,55 the IRS, through its ability to interpret how the partnership classification
regulations applied to LLCs, still possessed a great deal of power over the future
viability of LLCs. The subcommittee members asked if LLCs could lack free
transferability of interests with a lesser threshold of consent (majority instead of
unanimity) and received encouraging comments, but no promises from the IRS
attorneys.56 Business lawyers knew that LLCs could not be utilized on any large
scale if the IRS insisted on requiring unanimous consent to transfer a complete
interest.57
In 1991, new LLC legislation only increased modestly when compared to 1990
activity.58 Although only four more states enacted LLC statutes, 59 approximately
avoid prompting the IRS to reevaluate its position on LLCs).
51 Letter from Barbara C. Spudis, Chair of LLC Subcommittee under the Section of
Taxation's Partnership Committee, to Richard Manfreda, Deputy Assistant Chief Counsel,
Passthroughs & Special Industries Branch, IRS (Oct. 22, 1990) (on file with author) (listing nine
issues for November meeting-five of which addressed partnership classification).
52 See Dec. 7, 1990 Letter, supra note 48 (describing issues discussed and the responses
received from the IRS attomeys). The persons attending from the ABA were Barbara C. Spudis,
Richard Levine, Stuart Levine, Bob Keatinge, and Alan Donn. The persons attending from the IRS
were Paul F. Kugler (Assistant Chief Counsel, Passthroughs & Special Industries), Richard
Manfreda (Deputy Assistant Chief Counsel, Passthroughs & Special Industries), Arthur B. Emst
(Chief Counsel, Passthroughs & Special Industries), J. Thomas Hines (Attorney, Branch 2), and
Susan Hamill (Attomey, Branch 1).
53 See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
54 See infra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
55 See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
56 See Dec. 7, 1990 Letter, supra note 48, at 6.
57 See Feb. 6, 1991 Report, supra note 49, at 1, 3.
58 In addition to important unresolved partnership classification issues, the question whether
the LLC's limited liability protection would be recognized beyond the borders of the state
authorizing formation probably hindered state enactments in the three years immediately following
the IRS's Revenue Ruling 88-76. See Hamill, Possible Choice, supra note 2, at 744; Robert R.
Keatinge, et a., The Limited Liability Company: A Study of the Emerging Entity, 47 Bus. LAw.
375,447-56 (1992).
59 See The Texas Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 901, § 46, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 3161,
3192 (enacted June 16, 1991); The Utah Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 258, 1991 Utah Laws
991 (enacted Mar. 18, 1991); The Virginia Limited Liability Company Act, 1991 Va. Acts ch. 168
(enacted Mar. 12, 1991); Act ofJune 25, 1991, ch. 442, 1991 Nev. Stat. 1184, 1292 (enacted June
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1,700 new LLC filings displayed a clear, unmistakable trend upwards.60 In order to
increase the number and kinds of businesses that could use LLCs, the two ABA
subcommittees continued their work, which focused largely on convincing the IRS
to resolve unanswered partnership classification questions favorably toward
LLCs.61 After several drafts among subcommittee members,62 on March 12, 1992,
the ABA's Section of Taxation officially submitted comments to the IRS entitled,
Comments on Limited Liability Companies: Tax Classification and Application of
Partnership Tax Rules.63
Six of the seven major points in the March 12, 1992 comments urged the IRS
to apply the partnership classification rules less restrictively than applied under the
Wyoming Revenue Ruling of 1988.64 The comments opined that LLCs should still
lack continuity of life even if a dissolution event with respect to only some of the
25, 1991).
60 See Hamill, Corporate Integration, supra note 3, at 440.
6 1 See Memorandum from Barbara C. Spudis, Chair of LLC Subcommittee under the Section
of Taxation's Partnership Committee to Subcommittee Members (May 13, 1991) (on file with
author) (announcing preparation of first draft of LLC comments for the IRS; soliciting internal
comments); Memorandum from Barbara C. Spudis to Subcommittee Members (July 16,1991) (on
file with author) (circulating the draft for comment); Letter from Robert R. Keatinge, Chair of LLC
Subcommittee under the Section of Business Law's Committee on Partnerships and
Unincorporated Business Organization, to Subcommittee Members (Oct. 3, 1991) (on file with
author); Transcript of Meeting of the Subcommittee on Limited Liability Companies 7-14 (Nov.
7, 1991) (on file with author) (discussion of the partnership classification regulations, mainly how
far the business provisions addressing dissolution and transferability could stray from the
Wyoming Revenue Ruling without jeopardizing partnership classification, dominated the
meeting).
62 See Letter from Robert R. Keatinge, Chair of LLC Subcommittee under the Section of
Business Law's Committee on Partnerships and Unincorporated Business Organizations, to
Barbara C. Spudis, Chair of LLC Subcommittee under the Section of Taxation's Partnership
Committee (July 23, 1991) (on file with author) (IRS undecided on issue ofmajority rather than
unanimous consent for transfers); Letter from Stuart Levine, Member of Section of Taxation's
LLC Subcommittee, to Barbara C. Spudis (Nov. 25, 1991) (on file with author) (manager-
managed LLCs should only possess centralized management when their power and authority
matches that of corporate directors; the effect of withdrawals and bankruptcy of a member on the
LLC lacking continuity of life should be brought up at a later time); Letter from Dale G. Schedler
of Lewis, Rice, & Fingersh, to Barbara C. Spudis (Nov. 25, 1991) (on file with author) (pre-
agreements allowing members to transfer to identifiable transferee should not prevent the LLC
from lacking free transferability of interests).
6 3 See Letter from Peter L. Faber, Chair, ABA's Section of Taxation, to Shirley D. Peterson,
Conn'r of the IRS (Mar. 12, 1992) (on file with author); Report from ABA Section of Taxation
Committee on Partnerships to IRS (Feb. 27, 1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter 1992
Comments].
6 4 See 1992 Comments, supra note 63, at 2; Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
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members, the manager for example, trigger a dissolution. 65 Moreover, a majority,
rather than all the members, should be able to agree to continue the business without
jeopardizing continuity of life.66 LLCs should still lack free transferability of
interests even if the manager or a majority of the members, rather than all the
members, can consent to a complete transfer.67 These standards sought for LLCs
were based on the IRS's current treatment of limited partnerships 68 and were
necessary to use LLCs for larger, complex, and often investment-oriented
transactions that needed to minimize the dissolution potential and maximize the
ability to freely transfer interests. 69 Finally, the comments asked the IRS to issue a
revenue procedure setting out general guidelines for LLCs seeking favorable
partnership classification private letter rulings,70 publish for each state a partnership
classification revenue ruling similar to Wyoming's, and provide state drafting
committees informal non-binding guidance on partnership classification points.71
From 1992 through 1996, LLC legislation swept across the country. In 1992 ten
additional states, including Delaware, passed legislation recognizing LLCs, bringing
65 See 1992 Comments, supra note 63, at 3.
66 See id. at 3-4.
67 See id. at 4-5. The comments also asked for further guidance concerning the LLC's ability
to lack centralized management. The comments implied that LLCs with managers owning a
significant interest in the LLC-20% being the threshold for general partner ownership in a limited
partnership-should be able to lack centralized management. See id. at 5.
6 8 IRS practice at that time allowed limited partnerships to lack continuity of life even when
the dissolution events only applied to the general partner;, moreover, a majority in interest of the
limited partners could continue the business if such dissolution event occurred. Limited
partnerships also lacked free transferability of interests even though the general partner, or
alternatively a majority of the limited partners, provided consent for transfers. See Hamill,
Partnership Classification, supra note 5, at 581-87.
69 See Feb. 6, 1991 Report, supra note 49, at 3 ("[U]ntil the transferability issue is resolved,
limited liability companies will not be of much use."); Letter from Barbara C. Spudis, Chair of the
LLC Subcommittee under the Section of Taxation's Partnership Committee, to Brian L. Schorr
(Jan. 14, 1992) (on file with author) ("If the IRS rules that an LLC lacks continuity of life when
events of dissolution are tied to only one member, this will greatly increase our practical ability to
use LLCs."); see also Hamill, Partnership Classification, supra note 5, at 591-98 (after the IRS
issued Revenue Procedure 95-10, essentially applying the partnership classification rules to LLCs
in the same manner as limited partnerships, LLCs can effectively be used for transactions currently
done as limited partnerships).
70 The Section of Taxation's LLC Subcommittee based this request on Revenue Procedure
89-12, which sets out guidelines for limited partnerships to safely obtain a partnership
classification ruling. See Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-1 C.B. 789, 799. See also Hamill, Partnership
Classification, supra note 5, at 569, 585, 586, 588 (describing the details of Revenue Procedure
89-12 and generally noting that the partnership classification regulations failed to make any
significant distinctions between limited partnerships and corporations).
71 See 1992 Comments, supra note 63, at 7-8.
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the total to eighteen.72 In 1993, the year showing the greatest number of state
enactments, eighteen additional states passed LLC legislation, bringing the total to
thirty-six.73 By the end of 1994, twelve additional states,74 including New York and
72 See Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 113, 1992 Ariz. Sess. Laws 394 (enacted June 2,
1992) (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 29-601 to 29-854); Limited Liability Company Act, ch.
434,68 Del. Laws 1329 (enacted July 22, 1992) (codified at DEL. CODEANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-101 to
18-1109 (1993 & Supp. 1998)); Limited Liability Company Act, Pub. Act. 87-1062, 1992 III.
Laws 2529 (enacted Sept. 1, 1992) (codified at 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/1-1 to 180/60-1
(West Supp. 1998)); Limited Liability Companies, ch. 1151, 1992 Iowa Act 238 (enacted April
27, 1992) (codified at IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 490A.I 00-490A.1601 (West Supp. 1998)); Limited
Liability Company Act No. 780, 1992 La. Acts. 2083 (enacted July 7, 1992) (codified at LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 1301-1369 (West 1994 & Supp. 1999))- Maryland Limited Liability Company
Act, ch. 536, 1992 Md. Laws 3286 (enacted May 26, 1992) (codified at MD. CODE ANN., CORPS.
& ASS'NS §§ 4A-101 to 4A-1 103 (1993 & Supp. 1998)); Act of Apr. 29, 1992, ch. 517, 1992
Minn. Laws 1168 (enacted Apr. 29, 1992) (codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 322B.01--322B.960
(West 1995 & Supp. 1999)); Oklahoma Limited Liability Company, ch. 148, 1992 Okla. Sess.
Laws 483 (enacted May 1, 1992) (codified at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2000-2060 (West
1999)); Rhode Island Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 280, 1992 R.I. Pub. Laws 1108 (enacted
July 21, 1992) (codified at R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-16-1 to 7-16-75 (1992 & Supp. 1998)); West
Virginia Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 41, 1992 W. Va. Acts 305 (enacted March 6, 1992)
(codified at W. VA. CODE §§ 3 IB-1-101 to 31 B-13-1304 (1996 & Supp. 1998)).
73 See Alabama Limited, Liability Company Act, Act No. 93-724, 1993 Ala. Acts 1425
(enacted May 20, 1993) (codified at ALA. CODE §§ 10-12-1 to 10-12-61 (1995)); Small Business
Entitiy Tax Pass Through Act, Act 1003, 1993 Ark. Acts 2928 (enacted Apr. 12, 1992) (codified
at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-3-101 to 4-32-1401 (Michie Supp. 1997)); Connecticut Limited Liability
Company Act, Pub. Act No. 93-267, 1993 Conn. Acts 884 (enacted June 23, 1993) (codified at
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 34-100 to 34-242 (West 1997)); Act of Apr. 5, 1993, No. 174, 1993 Ga.
Laws 123 (enacted Apr. 5, 1993) (codified, at GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-11-100 to 14-11-1109 (1994
& Supp. 1998)); Act of Mar. 26, 1993, ch. 224, 1993 Idaho Sess. Laws 760 (enacted Mar. 26,
1993) (codified at IDAHO CODE §§ 53-601 to 53-672 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998)); Act of May 13,
1993, P.L.8-1993, § 301, 1993 Ind. Acts 1694, 1970 (enacted May 13, 1993) (codified at IND.
CODEANN. §§ 23-18-1-1 to 23-18-13-1 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998)); Michigan Limited Liability
Company Act, No. 23, 1993 Mich. Pub. Acts 138 (enacted Apr. 14, 1993) (codified at MICH.
COMP. LAwS ANN. §§ 450.4101-450.5200 (West Supp. 1998)); Act of July 2, 1993 §§ 359.700-
359.832, 1993 Mo. Laws 965, 975-1003 (enacted July 2, 1993) (codified at Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 347.010-347.187 (West Supp. 1999)); Montana Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 120, 1993
Mont. Laws 269 (enacted Mar. 18, 1993) (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-8-101 to 35-8-
1307 (1997)); Act of June 2, 1993, LB 121, §§ 1-45, 1993 Neb. Laws 333, 335-50 (enacted June
2, 1993) (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2601 to 21-2653 (1997)); New Jersey Limited
Liability Company Act, ch. 210, 1993 N.J. Laws 1215 (enacted July 30, 1993) (codified at NJ.
STAT. ANN. §§ 42:23-1 to 42:2B-70 (West Supp. 1998)); Act of Apr. 7, 1993, ch. 28, §§ 1-74,
1993 N.M. Laws 2752,2753-828 (enacted Apr. 7, 1993) (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-19-
1 to 53-19-74 (Michie Supp. 1998)); Act of June 23, 1993, ch. 313,1993 N.H. Laws 323 (enacted
June 23, 1993) (codified atN.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304-C:1 to 304-C:85 (1995 & Supp. 1998));
Act of July 15, 1993, ch. 354, § 1, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 1080, 1080-1135 (enacted July 15,
1993) (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 57C-1-01 to 57C-10-07 (1997)); Limited Liability
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California, authorized the formation of LLCs under their laws. Only three remaining
states were without LLC legislation, and by the close of 1996, they had passed
statutes establishing the LLC in all U.S. jurisdictions.7 5 The rise in the number of
business organizations filing to operate as LLCs mirrored the meteoric pace of the
state statutes. In 1992, approximately seven thousand new LLC filings took place,
roughly four times the number of 1991 filings.76 From 1993 through 1995, new
LLC filings continued to grow explosively, numbering approximately 23,000 in
1993, 64,000 in 1994, and 115,000 in 1995.77 In sum, as ofDecember 31, 1995 over
210,000 business ventures had chosen the LLC form since the IRS recognized the
Companies, ch. 92, 1993 N.D. Laws 390 (enacted Apr. 12, 1993) (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 10-32-01 to 10-32-156 (1995 & Supp. 1997)); Oregon Limited Liability Company Act, ch.
173, 1993 Or. Laws 435 (enacted June 24, 1993) (codified at OR. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 63.001-
63.990 (Supp. 1998)); An Act to Provide for Limited Liability Companies, ch. 344, 1993 S.D.
Laws (enacted Mar. 13, 1993) (codified at S.D. COD=ED LAWS §§ 47-34A-101 to 47-34A-1207
(Michie Supp. 1998)); Act of Dec. 13, 1993, No. 112, 1993 Wis. Laws 708 (enacted Dec. 13,
1993) (codified at Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 183.0102-183.1305 (West Supp. 1998)).
74 See Limited Liability Company Act, 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws I (enacted June 8, 1994)
(codified at ALASKA STAT. §§ 10.50.010 to 10.50.995 (1998)); California Limited Liability
Company Act, 1994 Cal. Legis. Service 6009, 6025, ch. 1200, § 27, (West) (enacted Sept. 30,
1994) (codified at CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 17000-17705 (West Supp. 1999)); D.C. Stat. 310-50
(enacted May 18, 1994); 1994 Ky. Acts 1087 (enacted Apr. 11, 1994) (codified at KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 275.001-275.455 (Michie Supp. 1996)); Maine Limited Liability Company Act, 1993
Me. Laws 2168 (1994) (enacted Apr. 20, 1994) (codified at ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, §§ 601-
762 (West 1996 & Supp 1998))- Mississippi Limited Liability Company Act 1994 Miss. Laws 215
(enacted Mar. 15, 1994) (codified at MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 79-29-101 to 79-29-1204 (1996 &
Supp. 1998)); New York Limited Liability Company Law, 1994 N.Y. Laws 3240 (enacted July
26, 1994) (codified at N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 101-1403 (McKinney Supp. 1999)); 1993-94
Ohio Laws 634 (enacted Apr. 15, 1994) (codified at OHIO REV. CODEANN. §§ 1705.01-1705.58
(Banks-Baldwin 1993 & Supp. 1998)); Limited Liability Act, 1994 Pa. Laws 703 (enacted Dec.
7, 1994) (codified at 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8901-8998 (West 1995 & Supp. 1998)); South
Carolina Limited Liability Company Act, 1994 S.C. Acts (enacted June 16, 1994) (codified at S.C.
CODEANN. §§ 33-43-101 to 33-43-1409 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1998)); Tennessee Limited Liability
Act, 1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts 654 (enacted Apr. 22, 1994) (codified at TNN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-201-
101 to 48-248-606 (1995 & Supp. 1998)); 1994 Wash. Laws 1018 (enacted Apr. 1, 1994)
(codified at WASH. REV. CODEANN. §§ 25.15.005-25.15.902 (West Supp. 1999)).
75 See 1996 Haw. Sess. Laws 181 (enacted June 7, 1996) (codified at HAW. REV. STAT.
§§ 428-101 to 428-1302 (Supp. 1997)); An Act Relative to Business Organizations in the
Commonwealth, 1995 Mass. Acts 1000 (enacted Nov. 28, 1995) (codified at MASS. ANN. GEN.
LAWS ch. 156C, §§ 1-68 (Law. Co-op. & Supp. 1998)); An Act Relating to Nonprofit
Corporations: Limited Liability Companies: and Fraudulent Transfers, 1996 Vt. Acts and Resolves
567,645-94 (enacted May 22, 1996) (codified at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 3001-3162 (1997 &
Supp. 1998)).
76 See Hamill, Corporate Integration, supra note 3, at 441.
77 See id. at 442-45.
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LLC's ability to be classified as a partnership in 1988Y8 In an incredible stampede
that took less than twenty years, most of it occurring from 1990 through 1996, LLCs
traveled from an obscure unknown business form in 1977 to a well-recognized
alternative for doing business.
The activity level of the ABA LLC subcommittees grew and intensified in 1992
and 1993. On May 14, 1992, ABA representatives from the LLC Subcommittee
conducted a second informal meeting with IRS attorneys, this time to discuss the
comments submitted on March 12, 1992. Although the IRS attorneys were receptive
to preparing a general revenue procedure to guide LLCs through the private letter
ruling process, they gave no clear answers to the substantive partnership
classification questions.79 The sentiment on the LLC's ability to lack continuity of
life and free transferability of interests under the relaxed standards applicable to
limited partnerships received a lukewarm, but not a hostile response.80 The IRS
attorneys were not receptive to LLCs lacking limited liability, even if a member
assumed all liabilities.81 Nor were they prepared to recognize an LLC as lacking
centralized management under any circumstances if managers had been
appointed. 82
After much discussion,83 on September 14, 1993, the Section of Taxation of the
American Bar Association again submitted comments to the IRS in the form of a
draft revenue procedure for LLCs seeking partnership classification private letter
rulings.84 Prepared by the Limited Liability Task Force, these suggested guidelines
78 See id. at 446.
79 See Memorandum from Barbara C. Spudis, Chair of LLC Subcommittee under the
Section of Taxation's Partnership Committee, to Sanford C. Present, Stefan F. Tucker,
Phillip L. Mann, and Richard M. Lipton 2-3 (June 30, 1992) (on file with author) (IRS
attorneys receptive to one, rather than all the dissolution events, applying to the members
and also a majority threshold of consent to continue the business; IRS response to free
transferability questions vague and response to centralized management and limited liability
questions negative).
80 See id. at 2-3.
81 See id.at3.
82 See id.
83 See Memorandum from Stuart Levine, Member of Section of Taxation's LLC
Subcommittee, to Barbara C. Spudis, Chair of LLC Subcommittee under the Section of Taxation's
Partnership Committee (May 4,1993) (on file with author); Memorandum from Rich Blau of Snell
& Wilmer, to Distribution (Jan. 28, 1993) (on file with author); Letter from Richard E. Levine to
Barbara C. Spudis (Apr. 19, 1993) (on file with author) (comments and suggestions for the draft
revenue procedure).
84 See Section of Taxation, American Bar Association, Draft Revenue Procedure: Ruling
Guidelines For Determining Whether a Limited Liability Company is a Partnership or an
Association Taxable as a Corporation (Sept. 14, 1993) (on file with author) [hereinafter 1993
Comments].
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treated LLC managers as general partners for purposes of lacking continuity of life,
free transferability of interests, and centralized management.85 These comments
proposed that LLCs with at least one member assuming all personal liability should
lack limited liability.86
From 1992 through 1994, IRS participation on LLC projects grew in frequency
and viability. IRS attorneys appeared in numerous public discussions and
subcommittee meetings concerning LLCs. The questions posed to IRS attorneys
tended to revolve around how the partnership classification rules applied to LLCs.
The practicing Bar consistently asked whether LLCs could satisfy the partnership
classification rules under standards urged by the ABA's comments submitted in
1992 and 1993. Without promising that LLC managers would be categorically
treated as general partners, IRS attorneys were more receptive to looser standards
for continuity of life and free transferability of interests, but would not contemplate
LLCs ever lacking limited liability or centralized management if managers were
appointed. 87 IRS attorneys also assured the Bar that state-by-state LLC revenue
rulings88 and a general revenue procedure for LLCs would be forthcoming,89 and
85 See id at 4-8. The Draft Revenue Procedure allowed the LLC to lack continuity of life if
one event of dissolution with respect to one identified member (who did not have to be the
manager) triggered an actual dissolution, unless a majority in interest (defined as capital and profits
ownership) of the remaining members agreed to continue. See id. at 6 (text of Draft Revenue
Procedure). LLCs could lack centralized management if the managers owned at least 20% of the
LLC or the members still had agency powers despite the presence of managers (an intemal
management cormrittee). See id. at 6 (text of Draft Revenue Procedure). The LLC could still lack
free transferability of interests if the members had to obtain consent from a majority of the
managers before transferring a complete interest. See id. at 7 (text of Draft Revenue Procedure).
8 6 See 1993 Comments, supra note 84. The assuning member had to meet certain net worth
requirements imposed on general partners in limited partnerships seeking to lack limited liability.
See id. at 3, 6-7 (text of Draft Revenue Procedure).
87 See LLC Boosters Blitz Passthroughs Sessions, 55 TAX NOTES 1019 (1992); Catherine
Hubbard & Lee A. Sheppard, Guidance Forthcoming on LLC Classification, Practitioners Told,
58 TAX NOTES 824, 826; Susan Pace Hamill, Clarification of Remarks, 58 TAX NOTES (1993)
1385 [hereinafter Hamill, Clarification ofRemnarks]; Use ofLimited Liability Companies Seen Not
Jeoparding Corporate Tax Base, [Special Reports] Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 59, at J-4 (Mar.
30, 1993) [hereinafter March 30, 1993 Report]; see also Letter from Barbara C. Spudis, Chair of
LLC Subcommittee under the Section ofTaxation's Partnership Committee, to Task Force on LLC
Members (July 9, 1992) (noting IRS participation on plenary session panel on LLCs for the Tax
Section of the American Bar Association's 1992 annual meeting in San Francisco); Memorandum
from Robert R. Keatinge, Chair of LLC Subcommittee under the Section of Business Law's
Committee on Partnerships and Unincorporated Business Organizations, to Subcommittee
Members, at 2 (July 2, 1992) (noting IRS participation at April 1992 Business Law Subcommittee
meeting in Orlando, Florida).
88 See Hubbard & Sheppard, supra note 87, at 824; March 30, 1993 Report, supra note 87,
at J-4; IRS May Issue More State-By-State Rulings on Limited Liability Companies, Official Says,
[Taxation, Budget and Accounting] Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 88, at G-4 (May 10, 1993)
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they regularly gave informal assistance to state drafting committees.90 On
December 29, 1994 the IRS fulfilled its promise by issuing Revenue Procedure 95-
10, which provided the long awaited general guidelines for LLCs seeking a
favorable partnership classification ruling. For purposes of applying all four
partnership classification characteristics, including centralized management and
limited liability, this revenue procedure essentially allowed LLCs to enjoy the same
flexible standards applicable to limited partnerships. 9 1
In 1992, to further its goal of obtaining a favorable partnership classification
ruling for the Uniform LLC Act,92 the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws invited IRS representatives to attend the drafing meetings. The
representatives were to informally guide partnership classification sensitive areas-
mainly the dissolution, transferability, and management provisions.93 Throughout
[hereinafter May 10, 1993 Report]. By early 1993, the IRS issued state-by-state revenue rulings
on a regular basis; by the time the IRS proposed to eliminate the partnership classification
regulations, seventeen states had already received LLC rulings.
89 See Hubbard & Sheppard, supra note 87, at 824; March 30, 1993 Report, supra note 87,
at J-4; Treasury Official Outlines Possible Changes to Allocation, UBIT Proposals, [Taxation,
Budget, and Accounting ] Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 142 at G-5 (July 27, 1993); IRS Likely to
Issue Limited Liability Guidelines Early This Year, Official Says, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 7,
at G-3 (Jan. 11, 1994).
90 See Hubbard & Sheppard, supra note 87, at 824 ('he IRS is encouraging everyone
working on LLC statutes to call in and get advice .... 'It's' better to draft a statute properly and
get the tax aspects correct than have to go back and amend or deal with a possible unfavorable
ruling."); Hamill, Clarification ofRemarks, supra note 87; Letter from H. Bryan Ives Ill to Susan
Pace Hamill, IRS Attorney, at 6 (Sept. 23, 1992) (on file with author) ("We would appreciate it
if you could take a look at our legislation in this regard [numerous partnership classification
questions] and give us your informal, off-the-record comments."); Letter from Stuart Levine,
Member of Section of Taxation's LLC Subcommittee, to J. Thomas Hines, Attorney, IRS, at 1
(Oct. 24, 1990) (enclosing the Maryland LLC bill for informal comments on partnership
classification points).
91 See Rev. Proc. 95-10, 1995-1 C.B. 501. See generally Hamill, Partnership Classification,
supra note 5, at 589-98 (detailed discussion, noting minor discrepancies between the LLC and
limited partnership standards).
92 See Memorandum from Edith 0. Davies, Executive Secretary, National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, to ABA Sections and Committee Chairmen, at 4 (Dec.
30, 1992) (on file with author) ("[U]pon completion, the [Uniform Limited Liability Company]
Act will be submitted to the Internal Revenue Service for a favorable ruling").
93 See Letter from Edith 0. Davies, Executive Secretary, National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, to Susan P. Hamill, IRS, at I (Sept. 4, 1992) (on file with
author) (welcoming IRS participation in the drafting process); Letter from Edward I. Cutler, Chair,
NCCUSL, Drafting Committee on Limited Liability Company Act to Dianna Miosi, IRS (Aug.
31, 1993) (on file with author) (expressing appreciation for assistance during the drafting process);
Letter from Richard C. Hite, Chair, Executive Committee, National Conference of Comrnissioners
on Uniform State Laws, to Edith 0. Davies, Executive Secretary, National Conference of
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the entire process, compliance with the partnership classification regulations
remained a top priority94 and the relationship between the Uniform Law
Commissioners and the IRS remained cooperative and professional.95 On July 26,
1993, in time for the first reading, which was held in August of 1993, the IRS
provided the drafting committee with an informal nonbinding96 opinion letter
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (Dec. 10, 1992) (on file with author); see also
Memorandum from Steven G. Frost; Section of Taxation Adviser, NCCUSL Drafting Committee
on Limited Liability Company Act, to Members of ABA Section Task Force on Limited Liability
Companies (Jan. 26, 1993) [hereinafter Jan. 26, 1993 Memo] (on file with author). The
Memorandum states:
Susan Hamill of the Service attended and participated at the last drafting committee meeting.
She indicated that persons at the Service are very interested in the evolution of the LLC act
and will participate with the drafting committee in reaching positions as the act is drafted. As
a result; we have an unusual opportunity to shape provisions of the act as they are drafted and
receive approval from the Service before the act is adopted and passed by any states.
Id.
94 See Jan. 26, 1993 Memo, supra note 93 (setting out specific classification questions and
the general issue of whether the statute should require LLC business participants to meet the IRS's
guidelines); Letter from Robert R. Keatinge, ABA Advisor, NCCUSL Drafting Committee on
Limited Liability Company Act; to Richard M. Phillips, Chair, ABA Section of Business Law, at
2-3 (Dec. 21, 1993) (on file with author) (articulating the current policy issues, several of which
are partnership classification bases); Memorandum from Steven G. Frost, Section of Taxation
Advisor, NCCUSL Drafting Committee on Limited Liability Company Act, to Robert R.
Keatinge, ABA Advisor, NCCUSL Drafting Committee on Limited Liability Company Act (Nov.
3, 1993) (on file with author) [hereinafter Nov. 3, 1993 Memo] (general list ofimportant tax issues
to raise with the IRS; indicating that the partnership classification issues are the most important);
Memorandum from Steven G. Frost to Carter Bishop, Professor, William Mitchell College of Law
(July 14, 1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter July 14, 1994 Memo] (including a lengthy
discussion of meeting continuity of life with a majority in interest of the members agreeing to
continue the business).
95 See Letter from Dwight A. Hamilton, President; NCCUSL, to Stuart L. Brown, Associate
Chief Counsel (Domestic), IRS (Apr. 9, 1993) (on file with author) [hereinafter Apr. 9, 1993
Letter] (expressing thanks for IRS assistance at the Uniform LLC Act Drafting Committee
meetings); Hamill, Clarification ofRemarks, supra note 87.
96 The President of the Uniform Law Commissioners urged "an early and speedy ruling by
the service on the proposed Act so that when it is promulgated by the Conference in August of
1994, it will be immediately available to the states for enactment" Apr. 9, 1993 Letter, supra note
95, at 2. The drafters were concerned that states which had already secured their own partnership
classification revenue rulings would be unwilling to consider the Uniform Act without similar
assurances from the IRS concerning the Uniform Act. In response, the IRS Associate Chief
Counsel expressed willingness to continue helping the drafting committee, but firmly stated that
the IRS "cannot... provide assurances as to the tax consequences of the proposed statute until it
has been officially reviewed by all the offices within the IRS and Treasury Department whose
approval is required in order to make such a detenination." Letter from Stuart L. Brown,
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analyzing the partnership classification consequences of the draft Uniform LLC
Act.97 After additional meetings and correspondence between representatives of the
Uniform LLC Act and the IRS that were necessary to clear up several open issues,
many of which involved partnership classification,9 8 the Uniform LLC Act became
final at its second reading in August of 1994.99 After the IRS issued Revenue
Procedure 95-10, the drafters amended the Uniform ILC Act in order to incorporate
the revenue procedure's more favorable standards into the statutory default
provisions addressing dissolution and transferability of interests.100
The novelty of the long-anticipated Revenue Procedure 95-10 did not last.10 1
Associate Chief Counsel (Domestic), IRS, to Dwight A. Hamilton, President, NCCUSL (Apr. 26,
1993).
97 See Letter from Paul F. Kugler, Assistant Chief Counsel (Passthroughs & Special
Industries), IRS, to Edward I. Cutler, Chair Uniform LLC Act Drafting Committee, at 2-4 (July
26, 1993) (on file with author) [hereinafter July 26, 1993 Letter] (analyzing the partnership
classification rules under the draft provisions). The letter states that the provision ofthe Uniform
Act allowing a majority in number to continue the business fails to follow the regulations; LLCs
with business succession agreements as authorized by the draft may not lack continuity of life; an
LLC may not lack centralized management if certain members' agency authority is limited in the
articles; ambiguity concerning "manifestly unreasonable" restrictions may result in the LLC
possessing free transferability of interests. See id.
98 See Nov. 3, 1993 Memo, supra note 94, at I (outlining agenda for meeting with IRS
attorneys concerning the Uniform LLC Act; "I think the classification issues are most pressing
right now"); Memorandum from Robert R. Keatinge to Dianna K. Miosi and Jerry E. Holmes,
IRS, at 2-4 (Nov. 9,1993) (on file with author) (stating the agenda for meeting concerning current
status of Uniform LLC Act); Memorandum from Robert R. Keatinge, ABA Advisor, NCCUSL
Drafting Committee on Limited Liability Company Act, to Paul F. Kugler, Assistant Chief
Counsel (Passthroughs and Special Industries), IRS (Mar. 7,1994) (outlining final classification
questions before the second reading in August of 1994 and expressing great concern over
uncertain definition of majority in interest, the necessary consent threshold under continuity of life,
and the ability to eliminate agency authority for real estate transactions only while still lacking
centralized management); July 14,1994 Memo, supra note 94 (discussing ways to define majority
in interest in the draft).
9 9 See Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1994).
10 0 See Letter from Carter G. Bishop, Uniform LLC Act Reporter, to John M. McCabe,
Legal Counsel, NCCUSL (Jan. 1, 1995) (urging amendments to dissolution and transferability
provisions to reflect Revenue Procedure 95-10). Those amendments were made on January 20,
1995. See also Robert R. Keatinge & James W. Reynolds, Advisors Report on the Uniform
Limited Liability Company Act (Mar. 13, 1995), reprinted in RISTN & KEATING , supra note
46, at 1-2 (noting that the 1995 amendments to take advantage of the standards in Revenue
Procedure 95-10 added considerable complexity to the Uniform LLC Act).
101 See Lee A. Shepard, Officials Explain LLC Revenue Procedure, 66 TAX NOTES 932
(1995) (quoting an IRS official saying a meaningful possibility of dissolution must exist to lacl
continuity of life, which contemplates a legal possibility but not necessarily a factual possibility)
Juliann Avakian Martin, Official Discusses Standards for Classifing LLCs as Partnerships, 61
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On March 30, 1995, the IRS announced a proposal to eliminate the partnership
classification rules by allowing certain unincorporated businesses, including
domestic LLCs, to elect partnership or corporate taxation, and the rise of the LLC
Contributed greatly to this development°10 2 The public overwhelmingly favored the
proposal. 103 Almost a year later, on May 13, 1996, the IRS issued proposed
regulations,' 0 4 and on December 17, 1996, the final regulations, dubbed the
"Check-the-Box" regulations, permanently eliminated all partnership classification
considerations for LLCs and all other domestic unincorporated entities. All persons
filing under an LLC statute automatically receive partnership taxation.105 The
elimination of all partnership classification issues allows those using LLCs the
freedom to craft the dissolution, transferability and management provisions to
satisfy business goals alone.106
TAXNOTEs 1767 (1995).
102 See dI.S. Notice 95-14, 1995-1 IR.B. ("hIe existing classification regulations arebased
on the historical differences under local law between partnerships and corporations... [A]lmost
all states have enacted statutes allowing the formation of lirited liability companies . '..); see
also Rod Garcia & Nancy Loube, LLCs, or How the Government Got to Cheek-the-Box
Classification, 67 TAXNOTES 1139 (1995). Garcia & Loube note:
Three years ago... sponsors of the limited liability company structure peddled their product
at several committee sessions .... Now it's 1995, and times have indeed changed. Almost
every state in the nation has a statute dealing with LLCs ... The IRS has set up guidelines
for assuring that an LLC is classified as a partnership and not as a corporation for federal
income tax purposes .... With Notice 95-14... the government proposed to throw in the
towel on trying to define the lines that distinguish partnerships fom corporations.... [N]o
single entity is more responsible for Notice 95-14 than the LLC, which just a few years ago
was a new idea to many practitioners.
Id.
103 See Garcia & Loube, supra note 102; Rod Garcia, Treasuy OfficialsAddress Check-the-
Box Entities, 67 TAXNOTES 1009 (1995) ("There's nothing to complain about"); Sheryl Stratton,
IRS Proposes Check-the-Box Entity Classification Procedure, 67 TAX NOTES 26 (1995); Sheryl
Stratton et. al., Check-the-Box Regulations Dominate Discussions at Several Meetings, 67 TAX
NOTES 685 (1996); ABA Lawyers Embrace "Check-the-Box" Proposal and Say Extend it to
Foreign Organizations, 68 TAX NOTES 550 (1995). On July 20, 1995 the IRS held a public
hearing. See Rod Garcia, Let Foreign Entities Check-the-Box Too, Witnesses Tell IRS, 68 TAx
NOTES 375 (1995) (overwhelming support on the substantive merits).
104 See Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1-4 (1996).
105 See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1-4 (1996).
106 See LLCs May be Much Easier to Set Up, 95 LAW. WKLY. U.SA. 318 (1995) ('he
proposal is 'revolutionary.") (comment on Notice 95-14). In response to the elimination of the
partnership classification regulations, in July of 1996 the Uniform LLC Act was amended to
eliminate dissolution upon a member's dissociation. See UNiF. LLC Acr §§ 603, 801 (amended
1996), 6A U.L.A. 475 (Supp. 1998). See also RUMBSIN & KEATINGE, supra note 46, at app. C.
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The close of 1996, with all states possessing LLC statutes no longer shackled
by partnership classification concerns, marked the conclusion of the LLC's first
phase of development. The work of two distinct groups of LLC proponents, both
focusing on the needs of their clients, instrumentally contributed to the LLC's rise.
Although the first group's efforts superficially appear unsuccessful, its early efforts
forced the IRS to address the partnership classification of LLCs, thus paving the
way for the second group to encourage widespread LLC statutory enactments and
to fight the secondary partnership classification issues holding the LLC back. By
forcing the IRS either to rule favorably or openly treat limited liability as a corporate
superfactor, the efforts of the first group planted the seeds that led to the Wyoming
Revenue Ruling and ultimately to the LLC's future growth. The second group's
success, turning the LLC's raw potential into a mainstream choice for doing
business, can be explained by the widespread participation in the LLC cause by
many lawyers and other professionals from all over the country, the coordination
of these efforts by a few individuals, and the presence of little organized
opposition.107
III. THE LLC's EARLIEST HISTORICAL ORIGINS
A. Development of the Early Nineteenth Century Corporation Under State
Law Control
The opportunity to create the LLC as a new business form directly resulted
from the fact that the individual states, rather than Congress, enjoy primary
jurisdiction over the legitimacy of business organizations. Because the LLC exposes
the shortcomings of the current business tax system, Congress, if approached,
undoubtedly never would have allowed the LLC to secure legitimacy. 10 8 For as long
as America has existed, the primary authority over the creation of business
organizations has resided with the individual states. At America's beginnings, only
two business forms existed: the general partnership, which requires no formal
sovereign recognition, and the corporation, which has always required formal
recognition by a sovereign person or government.109 The earliest origin of the LLC
107 See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 11, at 19-20, 23-24, 70 (discussing interest group
influence and the role of organized opposition); see also Hamill, Corporate Integration, supra note
3, at 396 n.17, 397 nn. 23 & 24 (examples of isolated critics attacking the LLC in the early 1990s).
108 See Hamill, Corporate Integration, supra note 3, at 407-09 (discussing plan in early
1993 to hold hearings on LLCs and changes made to relax standards for S corporations, largely
prompted by LLCs). By exposing the inequities of the business tax system, LLCs undoubtedly
caused congressional discomfort.
109 See I JOSEPH S. DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS
91 (1917) (explaining that during the colonial period partnerships existed alongside corporations);
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can be traced to the point in America's past when the power to authorize
corporations vested under state rather than federal control, which lead to the states
irreversibly assuming general authority to create new business organizations.
Corporations have existed in America since the earliest colonial days.1 10 The
first colonial corporations obtained charters directly from the King of England. The
colonial assemblies, once established, granted corporate charters under the implicit
authority of the Crown, 11 thus establishing precedent for the future individual
states to retain the power over the corporate charter. However, at the dawn of
America's independence, the framers contemplated Congress having some authority
to issue corporate charters. Toward the end of the American Revolution, a
committee established by the first Congress started to investigate the possibility of
establishing a national bank with a congressionally issued charter.1 12 Although the
Articles of Confderation, ratified on July 9, 1778, failed to grant to Congress the
power to issue corporate charters,1 13 on December 31, 1781, by special ordinance
based on Alexander Hamilton's elaborate plan, 1 4 Congress incorporated the Bank
of North America.1 15 Because the bank's directors also secured charters from
see also UNIF. PARTNERsHw Acr § 6(1), 6 U.LA. 256 (1995) (giving the definition of
partnership); ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON
PARTNERSHIPS §§ 2.01, 2.13 (1996) (stating that, unlike corporations, partnerships require no
formalities). Predecessors of the modem corporation, existing long before the American colonies
appeared on the map, required formal recognition by a sovereign individual or government. See
1 DAVIS, supra, at 3 n.1; JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGrIMACY OF THE BUSINESS
CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF TEE UNITED STATES 1780-1970, at 2 (1970).
110 See 1 DAVIS, supra note 109, at 6-7 (the Crown issued charters directly to the earliest
colonial corporations); id. at 329 (business corporations existed prior to the revolution); HURST,
supra note 109, at 7-15 (explaining that English chartered companies were prominent in
establishing North Atlantic colonies, that royal governors and colonial legislatures chartered some
business corporations in the colonial years, and that trading companies that founded colonies
existed under royal charters); RONALD E. SEAVOY, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS
CORPORATION 1784-1855, at 9-32 (1982) (discussing early colonial corporate charters).
111 See I DAVIS, supra note 109, at 7.
112 The establishment of the bank was proposed on June 21, 1780, in Congress, and the
committee consisted of Mr. Ellsworth, Mr. Duane, and Mr. Scott. See LEGISLATIVE AND
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 9 (M. St. Clair Clarke & DA.
Hall eds., A.M. Kelley reprint 1967) (1832) [hereinafter U.S. BANK].
113 See ART. OF CONFED. (1778); see also 2 DAVIS, supra note 109, at 10.
114 Robert Morris, the Superintendent of Finance, officially proposed the Congressional
Bank, using a plan more than likely provided by Alexander Hamilton a few weeks before. See 2
DAVIS, supra note 109, at 35; 2 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 1779-1781, at 645
(Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1961) [HAMILTON PAPERS]; U.S. BANK, supra note 112,
at 14.
115 See 2 DAVIS, supra note 109, at 10 n.2; U.S. BANK, supra note 112, at 12-14.
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several states,1 16 it appears that they believed Congress's authority to be suspectl 17
The issue of whether Congress should have power over the corporate charter
arose during the 1787 Convention, which replaced the weaker Articles of
Confederation with the Constitution that continues to serve as America's final
authority. James Madison and others proposed that the new Congress be given
explicit power to grant corporate charters. The proposal, which was never adopted,
would have empowered Congress "to grant charters of incorporation in cases where
the Public good may require them, and the authority of a single State may be
incompetent."1 18 Although the Constitution failed to identify explicitly the source
of governmental power over corporate charters, 119 in 1790, dissatisfied with the
progress of the Bank of North America, 120 Alexander Hamilton, then Secretary of
116 In 1782 the directors of the Bank of North America secured a corporate charter from
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New York Moreover, North
Carolina and New Jersey validated the ordinance without actually granting the bank a charter. See
2 DAVIS, supra note 109, at 38. Despite all these validations, the Bank of North America appeared
to operate exclusively under the Pennsylvania charter. See U.S. BANK, supra note 112, at 25.
Several years later, in 1785, when Pennsylvania revoked the Bank's charter, the directors quickly
secured a replacement charter from the Delaware legislature. See 2 DAVIS, supra note 109, at 42-
43.
1 17 See ART. OF CONFED. art 11 (1778) (stating that congressional power must be explicitly
provided for). The Articles' powers left the central government with weak taxing authority and no
ability to regulate commerce. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN CONSIUTION 24-25 (1990); ANDREW C. MCLAUGHLIN, A CONSTIThTONAL
HISTORYOF THEUNTED STATES 140-41 (1935); see also 2 DAVIS, supra note 109, at 10 (quoting
a letter written by James Madison to Edmund Pendleton on January 8,1782, which stated that the
Articles of Confederation did not empower Congress to incorporate a bank but a congressional
charter provided prestige with an understanding that the states would validate the bank within their
respective jurisdictions). See generally MERRILL JENSEN, T)HE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: AN
INTERPRETATION OF THE SocIAL-CoNS= ONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUrION
1774-1781, at 241 (1940) (discussing the distribution ofpower between the states and the federal
government under the Articles of Confederation).
118 TIH RECORDS OF THFEDERAL CON ON OF 1787, at 325 (Max Farrand ed., 1937);
see also id. at 614-17 (Madison noting the proposal of Congressional powers to establish
corporations was referred to committee); id. at 362, 375-76 (Madison and Baldwin mention that
the proposed enumerated power of Congress to erect corporations was debated and struck out);
Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank, 8 HAMILTON
PAPERS, supra note 114, at 97, 99-100; 2 DAVIS, supra note 109, at 12 (discussing Madison's
proposal).
1 19 See 2 DAVIS, supra note 109, at 13-14.
120 The Pennsylvania legislature's reinstatement of the Bank of North America's charter
restricted the amount of stock in the bank to two million dollars, as opposed to the original limit
often million. Hamilton's proposal cites these restrictions as a reason for creating the Bank of the
United States. See U.S. BANK, supra note 112, at 25.
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the Treasury, drafted a report urging Congress to charter another national bank.121
After much debate addressing whether the Constitution empowered Congress to do
so, 12 2 on February 25, 1791 President Washington signed into law the charter for
the Bank of the United States.123
Despite the early congressional charters issued for banks, the state legislatures,
apparently by default, 124 assumed the general power to grant corporate charters in
the years following the American Revolution. No evidence exists documenting an
explicit discussion by the framers addressing the general power to issue corporate
charters. 125 This lack of explicit discussion can be explained by the relative
unimportance of corporations at that time.126 During America's colonial period and
121 See id. at 15-35.
122 See id. at 35-86. The Senate created a committee to study Hamilton's bank proposal. The
President solicited opinions addressing whether the Constitution supported a congressional charter
from Attorney General Edmund Randolph, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, and Secretary of
the Treasury Alexander Hamilton. Randolph and Jefferson, strictly construing the powers of the
Constitution, believed a congressional charter to be unconstitutional. Hamilton wrote a lengthy
response favoring a congressional charter for the bank. See id. at 89-113. The House voted 39 to
20 for the charter and the Senate also passed the charter. Apparently "[t]he Senate Proceedings
[did] not indicate the strength of the opposition." 2 DAVIS, supra note 109, at 14-15.
123 See U.S. BANK, supra note 112, at 85.
124 See JOHN W. CADMAN, JR., THE CORPORATION IN NEW JERSEY 3-4 (1949) ("[']n the
absence of express designation of incorporating authority, the power to incorporate was an implied
and exclusive right of the legislature."); HURST, supra note 109, at 139-41 (discussing how the
federal role was limited, not by formal Constitutional bounds, but by working tradition).
125 While the Articles of Confederation remained in effect, any attempt by Congress to take
general jurisdiction over corporate charters would have been unconstitutional. See supra note 117.
Apparently the degree to which Congress possessed limited powers under the Constitution to issue
corporate charters was discussed at the Constitutional Convention, with many believing that
Congress did have the power to incorporate based upon its power "to legislate in cases where the
states should not be severally competent."4 DAVIS, supra note 109, at 13-14. This issue also came
up a few years after the Convention in connection with the congressional charter for the Bank of
the United States. In a letter written to George Washington, Alexander Hamilton stated that
Congress did have limited powers to incorporate because no language reserved these powers
exclusively to the states. On the other hand, Thomas Jefferson, who took a strict constructionist
view of the Constitution, believed no such power existed and that the Bank's charter was
unconstitutional. See U.S. BANK, supra note 112, at 95-112. These discussions fail to address
directly the more important issue concerning which branch possessed general authority to issue
corporate charters.
126 See LAWRENCEM. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OFAMERICAN LAW 188 (2d ed. 1985) (stating
that corporations were uncommon before 1800). Several critical issues occupied the Constitutional
Convention, including the details of establishing a strong federal government, see THE FEDERALIST
No. 9 (Alexander Hamilton); MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 117, at 163, representation in Congress,
see FARBER& SHERRY, supra note 117, at 112, and, most importantly, the slavery issue, including
future limitations on trade and the extent to which slaves would be counted (ultimately slaves
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for a few years thereafter,127 the vast majority of the people in America's
agriculturally based society labored on family farms producing the goods necessary
for their own survival and occasional surplus to be bartered.128 The manufacture of
goods produced by artisans in small shops and the business of merchants engaged
in importing and exporting grew steadily around the cities clustered at the seaboard,
with the sole proprietorship and the partnership serving as the legal forms for
conducting these businesses.129 The crude and undeveloped state of transportation
made any large-scale movement of goods from the cities prohibitively expensive
and kept business at small levels.130 Business discrepancy had not yet evolved to
a point where the legal benefits1 31 of forming a corporation proved useful.132 The
counted only three-fifths for every white man) for representation purposes. See id. at 147-49, 164-
65.
12 7 Of the more than three hundred business corporations chartered in America by 1800,
most of them secured their charters after 1789. See 2 DAVIS, supra note 109, at 8; see also
SEAVOY, supra note 110 at 53-65 (discussing early business corporations); HURST, supra note
109, at 17 (giving statistics on business corporations after 1780).
12 8 See STUART BRUCHEY, THEROOTS OFAMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH, 1607-1861, at
23 (1965) (stating that land was the most important capital in the agricultural colonial economy);
ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN
BUsINESS 17, 51 (1977) (noting that in 1790 the American population numbered 3,930,000 with
only 202,000 living in towns or villages, close to 90% of the workers laboring on farms); SEAVoY,
supra note 110, at 258 (explaining that due to abundance of land, shortage of capital and
technological backwardness, the United States appeared to be one of the least likely nations to
industrialize); CAROLINE F. WARE, THE EARLY NEW ENGLAND COTTON MANUFACTURE: A STUDY
IN INDUSTRIAL BEGINNINGS 1-8 (1931) (discussing how agriculture possessed such great potential
that few in the late 18th century contemplated that America's future would be in industry rather
than agriculture).
129 See CHANDLER, supra note 128, at 28 (stating that merchants operated in partnerships for
shipping and financial ventures); see also id. at 51-52 (describing business practices of artisans
in American seaboard cities of late 18th century).
130 See id. at 32 (stating that colonial roads limited, with "travel over them a bone-shaking
experience," and although most passengers and nearly all freight moved by water, the colonial
period saw no common carrier water routes except a small number offerries); CHARLES SELLERS,
THE MARKEr REVOLUTION 5 (1991) (discussing how roads beyond seaboard cities were few,
badly maintained, and often impassible, making hauls beyond 30 or 40 miles more expensive than
the goods).
131 The principal legal benefits of forming early corporations arose from the formation of a
separate entity that existed beyond the natural life of the owners and was able to pool large
amounts of capital and own property. See I DAVIS, supra note 109, at 5; see also Robert L.
Raymond, The Genesis of the Corporation, 19 HARV. L. REV. 350, 354-58 (1906). The legal
benefit of limited liability protection developed later at an uneven pace across the states. See
generally CADMAN, supra note 124, at 36-40 (discussing charters being issued without opposition
and without mentioning limited liability); EDWIN MERRICK DODD, AmERICAN BUSINESS
CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860, at 272-390 (1954) (discussing the evolution of limited liability);
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colonial assemblies and the early state legislatures granted corporate charters
primarily for public purposes, including the establishment of towns, churches,
cemeteries, colleges, and charities.133
Especially after 1790, state-issued corporate charters for banks proliferated in
order to supply credit to the nation's rapidly growing business economy. 134 State-
chartered banks, which numbered over two hundred by 1815,135 played a prominent
role in the nation's economy through the circulation of bank notes that served as a
medium of exchange within the nation's currency.136 During the decades leading
up to and just after the War of 1812, the number of state-issued corporate charters
increased rapidly because canals and turnpikes increased rapidly, representing the
first step in America's transportation revolution. 137 Unlike the majority of purely
private business enterprises, 138 which still operated in the partnership form, 139
HERBERT HOvENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937, at 49-55 (1991)
(discussing the development of limited liability noting that it generally became entrenched during
the Jacksonian period); SEAVOY, supra note 110, at 68-72 (discussing early 19th century case law
addressing limited liability).
132 Only seven business corporations existed in the colonies. See 2 DAVis, supra note 109,
at331 app. A.
133 See id. at 329; see also SEAVOY, supra note 110, at 1-32 (discussing the earliest
American corporations in the colonial days and the years immediately following the Revolution);
Simeon E. Baldwin, American Business Corporations before 1789, 8 AM. HIST. REV. 449 (1903)
(investigating the features of the nation's earliest corporations).
134 See CHANDLER, supra note 128, at 28-31; SELLERS, supra note 130, at 15, 18, 23.
135 See CHANDLER, supra note 128, at 30 (stating the number climbed to 307 by 1820);
SELLERS, supra note 130, at 46.
136 See CHANDLER, supra note 128, at 29 (discussing the role of state-chartered banks and
how their notes came to serve as a medium of exchange because of the limited amount of coin and
bills of exchange and the lack of government-issued paper money).
137 See SELLERS, supra note 130, at 40-43 (describing early boom in canal and turnpike
state-issued corporate charters); id at 391-92 (describing early efforts to build railroads in the late
1830s and early 1840s). See generally GEORGE ROGERS TAYLOR, THE TRANSPORTATION
REVOLUTION 15-31 (1951) (roads and bridges); id. at 32-55 (canals).
138 Although many of the corporate charters granted after 1800 for canals, turnpikes, and
banks technically went to private business entrepreneurs, these corporations did not operate as
private businesses in the same sense as the unincorporated businesses. In order to encourage these
badly needed improvements, the early special charters normally granted privileges in the form of
monopolies or franchises, causing these early corporations to resemble more closely towns or
public bodies than private competitive businesses. See MORTON J. HORWrrZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 116-18 (1977); SELLERS, supra note 130,
at 45, 53 (discussing the blurred line between public and private purpose in early transportation
and banking corporations); HOVENKAMP, supra note 131, at 113 (setting out Justice Story's
discussion of the difference between corporate charters granted with monopolies and franchises
and those involving common rights which should not confer monopolies or franchises).
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banks and transportation projects needed the legal advantages offered by the
corporate form, specifically the ability to pool large amounts of capital and to exist
beyond the natural life of the owners.140
The only constitutional impediment to the development of state-chartered
corporations might have been holdings by the Supreme Court that the federal
government enjoyed exclusive power over interstate commerce and that the
chartering of business corporations constituted interstate commerce. The Supreme
Court, led by Chief Justice John Marshall, considered the general question of
whether federal power over interstate commerce was exclusive or concurrent with
the states, opting for an interpretation of concurrent powers.141 State enjoyment of
concurrent rights with Congress over interstate commerce implicitly legitimized
state corporate charters, allowing them to continue without serious question or
analysis. 142 Thus, the Marshall Court gave the states a powerful head start toward
permanently assuming primary jurisdiction over the incorporation process.
139 See CHANDLER, supra note 128, at 36 (noting that despite the increased use of
corporations throughout the first half of the 19th century, for purely commercial enterprises the
partnership remained the standard business form until well after 1840); TONY A. FREYER,
PRODUCERS VERSUS CAPITALISTS 4 (1994) (stating that the majority of adult white males in
Antebellum America were self-employed in an unincorporated enterprise).
14 0 See CHANDLER, supra note 128, at 28, 32, 34; SELLERS, supra note 130, at 44.
141 Of the members of the Marshall Court, only Justice Story wanted federal powers over
commerce to be exclusive, but he could never muster a majority to support his position. See 3-4
G. EDWARD WHrTE, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 491,498-501
(1988) (summarizing Story's desire for a partnership relation between Congress and federal courts
in order to keep the federal government sovereign, and discussing negative reaction to Story's
position by others who feared elimination of state sovereignty. Justice Marshall, who generally
favored strong interpretations of commerce powers when Congress chose to act, equivocated, thus
paving the way for commerce powers to be shared concurrently with the states); see, ag., Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (Marshall reserving concurrent state powers to regulate
interstate commerce despite upholding federal regulation under the particular facts of the case);
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (Marshall recognizing the sovereignty ofthe
people forming the foundation of residual state powers); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819) (Marshall employing a coterminous power theory); 3-4 WHrrE, supra, at 458-
594 (Marshall believing in a strong federal government, but also conceding that the states must
retain some powers).
142 Although the states continued to exercise the general power to issue corporate charters,
Congress did charter specific corporations during the Antebellum period. See supra notes 115, 123
and accompanying text (discussing federal incorporation of the Bank of North America and the
Bank of the United States); see also Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, 1 Stat. 191 ("An Act to
incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States"); Act of Mar. 3, 1825, ch. 52,4 Stat.
802 (Acts of the states of Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, and of the Congress of the United
States, incorporating the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company); Act of May 24, 1828, ch. 86,4
Stat. 293 ("An Act authorizing the subscription to the stock of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal
Company") (examples of Antebellum congressional charters).
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In order to coordinate the piecemeal transportation efforts being undertaken by
the states, during the Fourteenth Congress John C. Calhoun attempted to start a
national transportation plan,143 embodied in the Bonus Bill. The Bonus Bill, which
passed by a two vote margin, would have launched a massive federally sponsored
effort "to bind the Republic together with a perfect system of roads and canals,"
funded by a $1.5 million bonus from the Second Bank of the United States.144
Because of serious disagreements over Congress's constitutional powers to
undertake this project, President Madison vetoed the Bonus Bill in 1817.145 This
defeat left America's transportation development almost completely under state
control, and the states continued to issue corporate charters for transportation
projects in greater numbers. 146
The constitutional debate that killed the Bonus Bill focused on the word
"necessary" in the clause empowering Congress to make all necessary and proper
laws related to its constitutional powers. The power to regulate commerce among
the states is the major tool for regulating business and commercial activity. Those
in favor of Alexander Hamilton's strong interpretation of congressional powers read
"necessary" to mean conducive, useful, or convenient, while those favoring Thomas
Jefferson's more restrictive view read "necessary" to require far more.147 Despite
Madison's concerns, the failed Bonus Bill probably would have passed
constitutional muster. When Congress chose to act, the Marshall Court defined the
federal Commerce Clause strongly enough to control not only commercial action
among the states, but also to control those intrastate activities having interstate
143 The first suggestions of a national transportation plan came from Thomas Jefferson's
Treasury Secretary, Albert Gallatin, but the coming of the War of 1812 shelved the idea. See
SELLERS, supra note 130, at 62.
144 Seeid. at 76, 78.
14 5 See id. at 79 (explaining how Madison vetoed the Bonus Bill the day before he left office
in March 1817); id. at 82-83 (describing how efforts by President Monroe to secure a
constitutional amendment to support the Bonus Bill killed by House Speaker Henry Clay over a
petty political slight). Although the federal government participated in transportation by providing
support through military engineers at West Point, the veto ofthe Bonus Bill and the defeat ofthe
constitutional amendment ended any real chance for Congress to take the lead. The commanding
force for these improvements largely stayed within state-chartered corporations. See id. at 83-84;
see also id. at 150-52 (describing national support for transportation under President Monroe);
FREYER, supra note 139, at 44 (desenibing Madison's veto as a"turning point").
146 Immediately after Madison's veto of the Bonus Bill, New York chartered the Erie Canal.
See SELLERS, supra note 130, at 79; see also id. at 316 (telling how national transportation support
died with Jackson's veto of Maysville road bill); CHANDLER, supra note 128, at 32-35 (citing
examples of state-chartered projects).
147 See SELLERS, supra note 130, at 77. Debate over the meaning of the word "necessary"
goes back to the dispute between Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson over the
constitutionality of the charter for the Second Bank of the United States. See supra notes 122-25.
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effect. This early broad interpretation of Congress's commerce powers first
emerged in the language of Gibbons v. Ogden,148 a 1824 case holding that an
exclusive license granted by the New York Legislature covering movement of
goods by steamboat between New York City and New Jersey fell within the
boundaries of federal regulation under the Commerce Clause because the license's
effect on interstate commerce.149
During the 1820s, undoubtedly fueled by protective tariffs adopted a few years
earlier,150 state-issued corporate charters for manufacturing companies grew
rapidly. 151 Although America's real Industrial Revolution remained several decades
away, 152 for most of the 1820s business and commerce steadily grew and the
business corporation experienced little overt controversy.153 However, within the
148 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
149 See id. (holding that a New York statute granting exclusive rights ofnavigation between
New Jersey and New York City to certain steamboat navigators was unconstitutional because it
conflicted with a federal statute; Johnson's concurring opinion broadly discusses the commerce
powers); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (holding that Congress
had power to establish Second Bank of the United States as a necessary and proper means of
regulating commerce); United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (Mem.) 61 (1809) (finding the Bank of
the United States, for jurisdictional purposes, to be a citizen and thus able to sue in federal court);
see also, 3 WHITE, supra note 141, at 547-52 (explaining that Marshall's decision in McCulloch
was structured so that the constitution sanctioned Congress to establish a national bank); id at
568-80 (noting that Marshall broadly interpreted the Constitution's grant of congressional power
to regulate "commerce among the states," giving the federal government extensive power of
commerce regulation).
150 See SELLERS, supra note 130, at 74-75 (describing the adoption of the first tariff act by
the fourteenth Congress in 1815 to protect American manufacturers from being driven out of
business by British competition); id. at 80-81 (describing support by President Monroe for the
continuation of and the strengthening of legislation protecting American manufacturers).
151 See id. at 133; FREYER, supra note 139, at 45 (noting large increase in factories operating
in corporations from 1800 to 1860); ARTHURM. SCHLESINGER, JR., THEAGE OF JACKSON 9 (1945)
(discussing percentage increase of persons in manufacturing); SELLERS, supra note 130, at 133.
152 See CHANDLER, supra note 128, at 3, 14,35,49, 50-51, 77 (explaining that although the
widespread use of the corporate form to pool capital represented the most significant institutional
development, it did not spawn the industrial revolution. As long as power remained limited to
traditional sources of animal, wind, and water, large scale industrialization could not occur;, the
availability of coal and iron provided the necessary power for large scale industrialization starting
in the 1850s.).
153 See CADMAN, supra note 124, at 36-37 (explaining that there was little opposition to
corporations until the late 1830s); HURST, supra note 109, at 30 (identifying the period from 1830
to 1860 as the time in which anti-charter feelings flourished); SELLERS, supra note 130, at 85-90
(discussing legal developments essentially protecting corporations); id. at 198 (discussing under-
currents of disaffection in the 1820s undetected among the elite).
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shadows of businesses' progress, the seeds of discontent were present. 54 America's
transformation from an agricultural and mercantile economy to a market economy
displaced and negatively affected many individuals.' 55 The rhetoric surrounding
Andrew Jackson's election in 1828 as the sixth President of the United States 156
denounced federal powers and harshly criticized banks, business corporations, and
other instruments of power oppressing the large majority of farmers and workers.' 57
Undemeath these simple messages, the policies of Jackson's administration and the
goals shared by proponents of Jacksonian Democracy reflected a more complex
agenda that in many ways accommodated the very business interests being
criticized.158 The wrath directed at banking focused exclusively on the Bank of the
154 See FREYER, supra note 139, at 20 (noting social tensions caused by the rise of
corporations); SCHLESINGER, supra note 151, at 30 (characterizing the 1820s as a decade of
discontent); SELLERS, supra note 130, at 163 ("Frustrated and angry, a populace that had ignored
entrepreneurs and their little-understood projects in times of piping prosperity moved into political
revolt."); id. at 172 (citing a warning by Secretary Calhoun to Secretary Adams in 1820 of a
"general mass of disaffection" without direction in search of a leader); id. at 198 (describing John
Quincy Adams and Henry Clay as having no clear idea of the dissatisfaction of the average
people).
155 See SELLERS, supra note 130, at 23 (generally noting that the commercial boom made
nine out often urban dwellers who worked with their hands worse off); id. at 137-39 (describing
the general misery following the Panic of 1819); sources cited at supra note 154.
156 See SELLERS, supra note 130, at 298-99 (describing Jackson's election with return
numbers showing a popular vote unmatched until the twentieth century).
157 See FREYER, supra note 139, at 48 (noting rhetoric identifying "the system of
corporations" as "nothing more nor less than a moneyed feudalism"); SELLERS, supra note 130,
at 173 (noting that before his election Jackson made flat statements that he opposed all banks on
principle); id. at 321 (describing Jackson's states' rights politics); id. at 301 (describing popular
enthusiasm along Jackson's inauguration route).
15 8 See FREYER, supra note 139, at 81 (noting that an attack on banks occurred as states
chartered more banks in order to provide badly needed credit); id. at 92-104 (explaining that
opposition to corporations was not unequivocal and discussing the taxing of corporations as a
means of keeping them accountable to the community); SCHLESINGER, supra note 151, at 190
(referring to the Democratic opposition to Whig monopoly which allowed bank charters for
deserving Democrats); id. at 306-21 (asserting that the intellectual position behind the Jacksonian
position was a complex conflict between producing and nonproducing classes); SELLERS, supra
note 130, at 359, 363 (describing how by 1840 "democracy proved safe for capitalism"); Reeve
Huston, The Nineteenth-Century Political Nation: A Tale of Two Syntheses, 23 REVIEWS AM.
HIST. 413 (1995) (reviewing SELLERS, supra note 130, which identifies capitalist development as
the defining issue of Jacksonian politics). See generally WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S
WELFARE (1996) (discussing vast areas of state regulation during Antebellum nineteenth century
and refuting the label of the period as being completely laissez faire); EDWARD PESSEN,
JACKSONIAN AMERICA (1985) (discussing the period of exploring the extent of true democratic
reform during an era of laissezfaire).
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United States,159 ignoring the large number of state banks, many of which engaged
in questionable financial practices. 160 Despite the sound credit practices and
stabilizing effects the Bank of the United States contributed to America's
economy,' 6 ' President Jackson vetoed the reissuance of the Bank's charter in
1832.162
Jacksonians did not oppose corporations per se. Rather, they objected to the
special privileges obtained in the special legislative charters. 163 Prominent
159 See SCHLESINGER, supra note 151, at 74-87,163 (general discussion of opposition to the
Bank of the United States); id. at 89 (quoting Andrew Jackson as saying, '"Thebank..., is trying
to kill me, but I will kill it'); id. at 231-32 (citing commentary of the day which suggested the real
issue lay "not between the people and the Bank of the United States, but between the people and
all incorporated institutions"); SELLERS, supra note 130, at 312-13 (describing how Jackson
emphasized the power of state government and urged Congress to consider alternatives to the
Bank of the United States).
160 See CHANDLER, supra note 128, at 30-31 (noting that state-chartered banks numbered
over 200 by 1815 and over 300 by 1820; after Jackson vetoed the charter for the Bank of the
United States, state-charted banks continued to grow, numbering 506 by 1834 and 901 by 1840);
FREYER, supra note 139, at 82 (noting that Jackson's opposition to the Bank of the United States
undercut resistance to state-chartered banks); SCHLESINGER, supra note 151, at 123 (claiming
banks engaged in the most flagrant abuses of corporate privilege); id. at 172 (describing an
alarming increase in ratio ofpaper money to specie from 1828 to 1833); SELIERS, supra note 130,
at 133 (describing questionable state bank practices and explaining that the desire to control these
practices was a major reason to recharter the Bank of the United States in 1815); id. at 161
(asserting that hard times were triggered by state-enforced debt collection and by the depreciated
notes of state-chartered banks).
161 See CHANDLER, supra note 128, at 30 (noting that during the late 1820s and early 1830s
the Second Bank ofthe United States provided excellent services and operated on an international
scale; the number of state-charted banks leveled off). Before enjoying success in the 1820s, the
Bank experienced controversy embodied in the 1811 defeat of its charter-primarily because it
diverted profits away from the state-chartered banks-followed by the charter's reissuance in 1815
by a large majority. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 151, at 74 (describing the workings of the
Second Bank of the United States); id. at 218 (stating that the Bank of United States provided "a
valuable brake on credit expansion" and that its destruction "accelerated the tendencies toward
inflation" ); SELLERS, supra note 130, at 62-63, 71-72; id. at 313 (describing benefits provided by
the Bank of the United States).
162 See FREYER, supra note 139, at 83 (discussing Jackson's veto of the "monster" Bank);
SCHLESINGER, supra note 151, at 90 (explaining that the veto message, written broadly as a
defense of the essential rights of the common man against an unjust govemment, was careful to
avoid the issue of hard versus soft currency that would also jeopardize the position of state banks);
SELLERS, supra note 130, at 332-37 (describing unsuccessful efforts of the Bank's supporters to
resurrect the charter following Jackson's veto); id. at 326 (discussing outrage of business
community at the veto and Jackson's easy reelection because of popular support of the veto).
163 See FREYER, supra note 139, at 25 (noting that corporations, as a condition to receiving
the special privileges of the charter, often were subject to taxes to fund public education and the
expenses of government); SCHLESINGER, supra note 151, at 126 (quoting Jackson emphasizing
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Jacksonians, wanting to cure the evils of special privileges conferred by the special
corporate charters, advocated the creation of general incorporation laws that would
allow equal access to the corporate form to all those meeting the statutory
requirements. 164 After President Jackson left office in 1836, state law general
incorporation statutes appeared in two states.165 During the 1840s the idea caught
on as six additional states passed general incorporation statutes.166 By the eve of the
Civil War, sixteen additional states enacted statutes, bringing the total to well over
fifty percent of the existing states. 167
By focusing on states rights and at least superficially, on equality, Jacksonian
that exclusive privileges of corporations were a mischief of power); id. at 175 (quoting a
Jacksonian who called the special privileges a "legislative evil").
164 See SCHLESINGER, supra note 151, at 48 (describing early attempts ahead of his time
made by Martin Van Buren-a prominent Jacksonian, in his capacity as Governor of New York
in 1817--4o create general incorporation statutes for banks); id. at 188-89 (discussing writings of
Theodore Sedgwickin 1834, which attacked the exclusive privileges granted by special corporate
charters and urged the creation of general incorporation laws allowing any group of individuals
to form a corporation). The rise of general incorporation laws throughout the nineteenth century
failed to spell the end of incorporation by special charter. A complete discussion of corporate
evolution away from special charters to a system marked by exclusive incorporation under general
statutes is beyond the scope of this Article and will be explored in a follow-up article.
165 See 1836 Pa. Laws ch. CCCCLX, § 1 (authorizing corporate formation without a special
charter "for the purpose of making or manufacturing iron from the raw material, with coke or
mineral coal"); CONN. GEN. STAT. tit. XIV, ch. 11, § 1 (1839) (authorizing corporate formation
without a special charter for the purpose of "engaging in and carrying on any kind of
manufacturing or mechanical or mining or quarrying or any other lawful business"). Although the
Pennsylvania and Connecticut statutes, clearly Jacksonian creations, marked the beginning of the
nationwide movement toward general incorporation statutes, New York, more than twenty years
earlier, technically enacted the first general incorporation statute. See 1811 N.Y. Laws ch. LXVI,
§ I (authorizing corporate formation without a special charter for the purpose of "manufacturing
woollen [sic], cotton, or linen goods.. !"). The motive behind New York's general incorporation
statute, to promote U.S. manufacturing enterprises and minimize the United States' dependence
on British imports, sets it apart from the early Jacksonian statutes. See SEAVOY, supra note 110,
at 63-68.
16 6 See 1847 NJ. Laws tit. V, ch. 6, § 1 "any... lawful manufactures"); 1843 Mich. Pub.
Acts No. 148 ("mining and manufacturing iron, copper or other materials"); Ohio Stat. ch. 29, § 80
(Derby 1854) ("manufacturing... or mining"); 1847 IowaLaws ch. 81, § 1; 1848 La. Acts §§ 1-
26; Wis. Rev. Stat. ch. 51, §§ 1-3 (1849).
167 See 1853 Cal. Stat. ch. 65, § 1; 1850 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 179, §§ 1-2; 1851 Mass. Acts
ch. 60-61; 1853 Vt. Acts & Resolves 60, §§ 1-2 (on file with author); ALA. CODE § 1473 (1852);
1852 Fla. Laws ch. 490; 1852 Ill. Laws § 1; 1852 Ind. Laws ch. 66, § 1; 1852 Md. Laws 44-46
ch. 322, §§ 1-2; 1852 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. LXXXI, § 1; 1854 Ky. Acts 179-180 och. 1012, §§ 1-2;
1853-1854 Va. Acts 32 ch. 46, §§ 1-2; 1853-1854 Ga. Laws. 24; 1857 Miss. Code ch. 35, § 1;
1858 Minn. Laws ch. 1, § 1; 1859 Kan. Sess. Laws 305, 315-16 ch. 36, § 34. By 1859, twenty-
five out of the then existing thirty-eight states or territories enacted general incorporation statutes.
See id. and supra notes 166-67.
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policies started the trend toward the creation of general incorporation statutes and
set in motion the legal landscape that cemented state law primary control over the
business corporation. 168 The states rights focus in the Jacksonian political arena
made any possibility of redirecting the state-centered-power over the corporation
toward federal control illusory. The Supreme Court, as led by Chief Justice Roger
Taney, who was appointed by Jackson in 1836, would have held unconstitutional
any federal attempts to stop or control the developing state general incorporation
statutes. The Taney Court substantially narrowed the scope of Congress's powers
under the Commerce Clause to cover only actual movement of commerce among
the states. 169 Consequently, the Jacksonian period, by establishing the state law
legislative forum over corporations critical for the LLC's birth more than a century
later, marks the earliest point of the LLC's origins.
B. State Law Control Over Corporation Entrenched by Early Twentieth
Century
The stampede of state general incorporation enactments continued after the
Civil War.170 During the 1860s, fourteen states passed general incorporation
laws. 17 1 The pace continued through the 1870s and 1880s, with nine additional
states recognizing general incorporation as an option to securing a special charter
by 1890, bringing the total percentage of states with statutes to well over ninety
percent.172 Following the Civil War, as the corporation experienced a vast legal
168 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 131, at 2, 36-39 (identifying the modem business
corporation as a Jacksonian product) SCHLESINGER, supra note 151, at 336-37 (discussing how
general incorporation laws were a Jacksonian creation to attack bank monopolies).
169 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 13 1, at 80; see also Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont
Bridge Co., 59 U.S. 421 (1855) (holding Pennsylvania act requiring bridges to be a certain height
did not impose on federal Commerce Clause power); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299
(1851) (holding federal Commerce Clause powerno longer exclusive of states' rights to control
commerce, provided that such state power does not interfere with the federal power); New York
v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102 (1837) (holding New York statute requiring vessel masters, originating from
other countries or states, to report the names of foreign passengers did not violate the federal
Commerce Clause power); HENRY ABRAHAM JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS 87 (1974) (discussing
states' rights posture of the Taney Court).
170 During the Civil War six states enacted statutes. See 1862 Me. Acts 118 ch. 152, §§ 1-2;
ORE. REV. STAT. § 1 (1862); 1863 W. Va. Acts ch. 83, §§ 1-10; 1864 Mo. Laws ch. 69, § 1; 1864
Laws, Jt. Resol. & Mems. of the Territory ofNeb. ch. 2, § 1; 1864-1865 Nev. Stat. ch. CXI, § 1.
171 See supra note 170; see also 1871 Territory Laws of Ariz. ch LI, § 1; 1866 N.H. Laws
ch. 4224, § 1; 1866 Wash. Laws 55, 57-58, §§ 1-4; Colo. Rev. Stat. ch. 18, § 1 (1868); 1867-
1868 N.M. Laws ch. Ill, §§ 1-2; 1869 Ark. Acts No. 92, 180; 1871 S.C. Acts, art. XV, § 1; 1869
Wyo. Sess. Laws 234,234-35 tit. 1, ch. 8, §§ 1-2.
172 See 1870Utah Laws 136,136-37, §§ 1-5; 14Del.Laws ch. 152, § 1 (1871); 1872 Laws,
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transformation 173 while business activity grew geometrically, 174 evidence shows
no federal attempts to regulate corporate activity until the Sherman Antitrust Act of
1890.175 Although the deliberations leading to the Sherman Act involved
discussions of federal incorporation, the Sherman Act itself addressed corporate
conduct that restrained trade, leaving the state's incorporation powers in tact.
Around 1890, state law still appeared adequate to regulate corporations, rendering
a wholesale replacement of the state charter system with one of federal control
seemingly unnecessary. After the Sherman Act big business continued to grow, and
thousands of consolidations encouraged firms to merge rather than collude.176
Mems., & Resols. of the Territory of Mont. § 1; 1822-1897 Tex. Gen. Laws 120, 120-123 ch.
XCVII, §§ 1-10 (1898); 1875 Ida. Laws § 1; C.L. ofDakota Territory 1887, ch.3, art. 1, § 2900;
1877 Dakota R.S. art. 1, § 384; 1890 Laws of Hawaii ch. 43, § 1; Okla. Stat. ch. 18, art. I, § 12
(1891); 1896 RI. Pub. Laws ch. 1200, § 2, cl. 5; Alaska Stat. ch. 37, §§ 798,799 (1913). Hawaii
and Alaska enacted general incorporation statutes before organizing as a territory. By 1903, all
fifty states or territories enacted general incorporation statutes. See id. and supra notes 170-71.
173 See HOVENKAM, supra note 131, at 14-19 (identifying three broad jurisprudential
categories of corporations over the course of the nineteenth century).
174 A detailed discussion of business growth beyond the Jacksonian period is beyond the
scope of this Article and will be explored in a follow-up article.
175 Codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1995); see HOVENKAMP, supra note 131, at 191,207,215,
219, 226-38, 241-47 (discussing the Sherman Act); see also id. at 137-38, 144-46, 207, 230
(discussing the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, a comprehensive federal statute designed to
regulate railroads; statute did not seek to regulate by removing power to issue corporate charters
from the states). Although the states still issued the vast majority of corporate charters, after the
Civil War, Congress chose to federally charter a number of specific corporations, including
railroad, telegraph, and navigation corporations whose business activities greatly affected
commerce among the states. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 1, 1869, Res. 15, 15 Stat. 346 (incorporating
the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, approved July 2, 1864); Act of Mar. 29, 1869, ch. 5, 16
Stat. 3 (incorporating the National Junction Railway Company); Act of May 4, 1870, ch. 75, 16
Stat. 97 (incorporating the Washington and Boston Steamship Company); Act of June 29, 1870,
ch. 168, 16 Stat. 168 (incorporating the National Bolivian Navigation Company); Act of July 8,
1870, ch. 224, 16 Stat. 192 (incorporating the United States Freehold Land and Emigration
Company); Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 122, 16 Stat. 573 (incorporating the Texas Pacific Railroad
Company); Act of Jan. 21, 1873, ch. 45, 17 Stat. 412 (incorporating the Loomis Aerial Telegraph
Company); Act ofJune 15, 1878, ch. 214, 20 Stat. 135 (incorporating the National Fair Grounds
Association); Act of Aug. 2, 1882, ch. 372, 22 Stat. 185 (incorporating the Oregon Short-Line
Railway Company to cover the Territories of Utah, Idaho, and Wyoming); Act of July 29, 1892,
ch. 322, 27 Stat. 326 (incorporating the Washington and Great Falls Electric Railway Company).
176 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 131, at 241-49; id. at 148 (stating that, because cartels
worked poorly, the railroad industry mergers would have occurred among railroads even absent
the Sherman Act); Lowe Watkins, Federalization of Corporations, 13 TENN. L. REV. 89,92-93
(1935). In the years following the Civil War, the Supreme Court decided mostly Reconstruction
cases. The commerce cases continued to focus on the movement of goods establishing the line
allowing federal regulation. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899)
(holding private contracts related to manufacture, sale, and transportation of goods among several
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In the early twentieth century, in response to increasing criticism directed at the
immense expansion of corporate power, commentators, 177 as well as the
administrations of Presidents Theodore Roosevelt William Howard Taft, Woodrow
Wilson, and Franklin D. Roosevelt, supported proposals requiring corporations to
obtain a federal license or a federal charter. 178 Despite substantial support; none of
these bills became law. Instead Congress chose again to regulate corporate conduct
with the Clayton Act of 1914, the Securities Act of 1933, and the Securities and
corporations covered by Sherman Act under authority of Commerce Clause due to direct affect
on interstate commerce encompassed by the movement of goods across state lines); United States
v. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (holding corporation's sugar manufacturing is local and
therefore outside the reach ofthe Sherman Act); Kiddv. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888) (holding state
statute prohibiting alcohol manufacture is constitutional because the Commerce Clause covers
regulation of transportation not transformation); FELIX FRANKFURTER, TIE COMMERCE CLAUSE
74 (1937); see also Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1868) (holding Virginia statute requiring
insurance companies to obtain state licenses constitutional, but implying that corporations doing
interstate business need no permission from individual states-thus, constituting the first sign of
Commerce Clause strength).
17 7 See I. MAURICE WORMSER, FRANKENSTEIN INCORPORATED (1931) (analogizing the
growth of corporate power to Mary Shelley's artificially created monster, Frankenstein); J. Newton
Baker, The Evil ofSpecial Privilege, 22 YALE L. J. 220, 234 (1913) (arguing for mandatory federal
incorporation); Winston S. Brown, The Federal Corporate Licencing Bill: Corporate Regulation,
27 GEO. L. J. 1092, 1116-17 (1939) (discussing federal licensing bill and criticizing predatory
corporate practices); James B. Dill, National Incorporation Laws for Trusts, 11 YALE. L. J. 273
(1902) (Address Before the Seminary in Economics of Harvard University, Mar. 10, 1902;
supporting permissive federal incorporation law); Joseph O'Mahoney, Federal Charters to Save
Free Enterprise, 1949 Wis. L. REv. 407 (contending that by eliminating the need to regulate
corporate conduct, federal incorporation and licensing proposals will effectively reduce the size
of the federal government); Watkins, supra note 176, at 89 (discussing the federalization of
corporations); H.L. Wilgus, Need of a National Incorporation Law, 2 MICH. L. REv. 358, 382
(1904) (arguing for a national incorporation law that gives the federal government the unequivocal
power to control incorporation); Comment A Federal System ofLicenses and Charters, 25 GEO.
L. J. 700 (1937) (discussing federal licensing bill and speculating that the bill can limit corporate
abuses) [hereinafter Federal System].
178 See Federal System, supra note 177, at 704 (discussing Theodore Roosevelt's ardent
support of federal regulation of corporations and Woodrow Wilson's endorsement of federal
licensing); Watkins, supra note 167, at 93 (describing Taft's proposal for optional federal
incorporation, known as the Taft-Wickersham bill); Joel F. Henning, Federal Corporate
Chartering for Big Business: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 21 DEPAUL L. REV. 915, 919
(1972) (stating that Presidents Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson all supported federal incorporation or
licensing); see also Compilation Prepared by Federal Trade Commission of Viewsfor andAgainst
Federal Incorporation and Licensing of Corporations, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., Doc. 92 Part 69-A,
at 32 (Sept. 15, 1934). Between 1903 and 1914, twenty bills wereproposed in Congress, overhalf
of which would have required federal chartering. See id. at 42-43. Between 1914 and 1932, eight
bills were proposed, only one of which required compulsory federal incorporation or licensing, all
other bills regulated corporate conduct in various ways at the margins. See id.
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Exchange Act of 1934.179 The federal licensing bills would have left state
corporation law in tact, requiring all corporations operating in interstate commerce
to obtain a license. Federal chartering would have replaced state corporation law
with federal corporation law.180 If successful, these proposals probably would have
passed constitutional muster.181 In 1905, the Supreme Court held in Swift v. United
States182 that price fixing among cattle dealers who were operating solely initrastate
fell within the range of regulation under the Commerce Clause because the
purchases fell within the "current of commerce," thereby affecting interstate
commerce. 183 The Supreme Court perfected the "current of commerce" theory
before the 1920s,184 paving the way for virtually all economic and commercial
activity to fall within reach of federal regulation under the commerce clause.185
179 Clayton Act of 1913, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27; 29 U.S.C. §§ 52,53 (1994); Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(a)-77bbbb (1994); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-
7811 (1994); see HOVENKAMP, supra note 131, at 246; Watins, supra note 176, at 92-93.
180 See Donald E. Schwartz, Federal Chartering of Corporations: An Introduction, 61 GEO.
LJ. 71 (1972) (giving an overview ofthe majorpolicy consideration involved in a study offederal
incorporation).
18 1 See Harris Berlack, Federal Incorporation and Securities Regulation, 49 HARV. L. REV.
396, 396-403 (1936); Brown, supra note 177, at 1117; H.W. Chaplin, National Incorporation,
5 COLUM. L. REV. 415, 415-16 (1905); Victor Morawetz, The Power of Congress to Enact
Incorporation Laws and to Regulate Corporations, 26 HARV. L. REV. 667, 667 (1913); Wilgus,
supra note 177, at 358. But see E. Parmalee Prentice, Congress, andRegulation of Corporations,
19 HARV. L. REV. 168 (1906) (arguing that commerce power insufficient to pennit federal
regulation of corporations).
182 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
183 See id. at 399.
184 See Houston, East & West Texas Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914)
(regulation of discriminatory rates technically occuning only intrastate within reach of commerce
clause); Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 26-27 (1911) (holding that the use of
defective railway can was not engaging in interstate hauls within reach of federal regulation under
the commerce clause). But see Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (holding
unconstitutional Federal Child Labor Tax Law); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251,277 (1918)
(federal law prohibiting the shipment of interstate goods manufactured by child labor
unconstitutional).
185 Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 862 (1985) (finding a federal law reaching
individual intrastate fire destruction activities in rental property constitutional); Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264,304-05 (1981) (finding a federal law
regulating mining activities conducted intrastate constitutional); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S.
146, 149-57 (1971) (holding Consumer Credit Protection Act prohibiting intrastate extortionate
credit transactions is constitutional); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,300-05 (1964) (Civil
Rights Act as applied to a restaurant which bought food in interstate commerce is constitutional);
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,249-62 (1964) (holding Civil Rights
Act, as applied to a motel which accepted out-of-state guests, is constitutional); Wickard v.
Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 118-29 (1942) (holding Agricultural Adjustment Act regulating personal
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If successful, the federal licensing and chartering proposals probably would
have prevented the LLC's invention. Congress would have possessed the ability to
either refuse to legitimize the LLC or, at least, deny the LLC a license, thus
confining LLCs to local businesses. These proposals failed because the states'
power over the incorporation process had become irreversibly entrenched. By the
time serious discussion of enhanced federal control took place, state law had been
chartering corporations without interruption since America's beginnings and general
incorporation statutes had been around for almost one hundred years. Moreover, in
the early twentieth century, the states further strengthened their hold over the
incorporation process by competing to produce the most business friendly general
incorporation statute.186 This competition among the states, a phenomenon known
in later literature as the "race to the bottom,"1 87 made general incorporation statutes
materially more attractive to business interests. By the second decade of the
twentieth century, the state general incorporation statute evolved to a commanding
position, with Delaware, still in a position it currently enjoys, emerging as the
corporate statutory leader.188 The defeat of the early twentieth century federal
licensing and chartering proposals and the perfection of the state law general
wheat farming has an "indirect" effect on commerce and therefore is constitutional); United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 111 (1941) (holding Fair Labor Standards Actregulating intrastate wages
is a valid exercise of Commerce Clause); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37
(1937) (holding legislation protecting union members from discrimination and preserving
collective bargaining rights is a valid exercise of the Commerce Clause due to "substantial
relation" test).
186In the late 1880s and early 1890s, a string of amendments, starting with the first
authorization of holding companies, established New Jersey as the early favorite for incorporation
and commenced the heated competition among the states. In 1888, New Jersey passed ground
breaking legislation allowing for the first time corporations to own stock in other corporations. By
1893, this legislation was perfected by allowing efficient accumulations of capital without the use
of trusts. In 1896, further revisions to New Jersey's statute produced the first modem liberal
incorporation law. See Edward Q. Keasbey, New Jersey and the Great Corporations, 13 HARV.
L. REv. 198,207-08 (1899).
187 For general discussions of the competition among the states to produce the most business-
friendly general incorporation statute, see HORWIZ, supra note 138, at 83-84; HOVENKAMP, supra
note 131, at 258; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits
on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1445-46 (1992); William L.
Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.L 663 (1974);
FRIEDMAN, supra note 126, at 523-25; HURST, supra note 109, at 147-48.
188 In 1913, new provisions to curtail antitrust activities resulted in New Jersey losing its
position, and Delaware quickly emerging as the favorite state for incorporation. See William E.
Kirk, III, A Case Study in Legislative Opportunism: How Delaware Used the Federal-State System
to Attain Corporate Pre-Eminence, 10 J. CORP. LAw 233, 255-58 (1984); see also RussELL
CARPENTERLARCOM, THMDELAWARE CORPORATION 155-79 (1937) (corporate charters for public
companies clearly favored Delaware in 1915).
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incorporation statutes allowed the states to continue exercising the primary power
over the creation of corporations, leaving the state law forum in place, which made
the LLC's invention possible approximately fifty years later 1 89
IV. TAX AND BUSINESS CONDITIONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
THAT LAUNCHED THE LLC
If the LLC's most distant seeds originated in special corporate charters issued
by state legislatures and early general incorporation statutes, its more direct roots
can be traced to the first modem income tax,190 enacted within months of Congress'
189 Although the states never lost the principal authority over the incorporation process,
throughout the twentieth century, Congress issued corporate charters for specific purposes. See,
e.g., Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73,
103 Stat. 183 (incorporating the Resolution Trust Corporation and the Resolution Funding
Corporation to provide firds from public and private sources to bail out failed depository
institutions); 29 U.S.C. § 1302 (1974) (incorporating the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
to encourage voluntary private pension plans and provide for timely and uninterrupted payment
of benefits); 12 U.S.C § 1716(b) (1968) (incorporating the Government National Mortgage
Association, separate from the Federal National Mortgage Association, to establish and encourage
secondary markets for mortgage-backed securities); 47 U.S.C. § 396 (1967) (incorporating the
Corporation for Public Broadcasting to encourage the growth and development of public radio and
television to address the needs of the unserved and under-served); 15 U.S.C. § 714 (1948)
(incorporating the Commodity Credit Corporation to stabilize, support, and protect farm income
and prices and to facilitate orderly distribution of agricultural commodities); 12 U.S.C. § 1811
(1933) (incorporating the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to insure the deposits ofbanks
and savings associations); 16 U.S.C § 831 (1933) (incorporating the Tennessee Valley Authority
to operate and maintain land in the interest of agricultural and industrial development, improve
navigation in the Tennessee River, and control destructive flood waters); 36 U.S.C. § 2 (1947)
(incorporating the American Red Cross to provide volunteer aid in times of war and to mitigate
suffering caused by disasters in times of peace).
190 In 1861, Congress enacted the first income tax to finance the Civil War. SeeAct ofAug.
5, 1861, ch. 45, 12 Stat. 292 (repealed 1872), discussed in RANDoLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 27 (1954). The Revenue Act of 1894 imposed the first peacetime income tax
assessing a two percent income tax on individuals and corporations. See Act of Aug. 27,1894, ch.
349, 28 Stat. 509, 553-54 (1894). Interestingly, an unenacted part of the proposal focused on
limited liability as the sole criteria for determining which entities faced the corporate tax. See 26
CONG. REC. 1594-95 (1894) (proposed amendment § 59). The Supreme Court subsequently held
the 1894 income tax to be unconstitutional. See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S.
429,583, modified, 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895). Congress structured the Revenue Act of 1909 as
an "excise tax" in orderto avoid constitutional problems. See Act ofAug. 5, 1909, ch. 6,36 Stat.
11. Throughout the nineteenth century the states imposed many different kinds of taxes on
property and income which affected corporations as well as individuals. See generally EDwIN E.
A. SELIGMAN, THEINcOMETAX 388-429 (1911); FREYER, supra note 139, at ch. 3 (big picture
discussion of state taxation of business during Antebellum period).
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ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment1 91 in 1913. In 1913 the choices among
business entities were the general partnership and the corporation, both available
since America's beginnings, as well as the limited partnership and the business trust
Limited partnerships, first appearing in New York in 1822,192 required a state law
filing and allowed limited partners, as passive investors, to enjoy limited liability
protection. The general partner managed the limited partnership's business or assets
and under the earlier statutes sometimes enjoyed limited liability protection.1 93
Business trusts, which involve no formal state law filings providing statutory limited
liability to the participants, first enjoyed widespread recognition by courts as a
legitimate entity for doing business in the late nineteenth century.194 The first
modem income tax, the Revenue Act of 1913, which carries forward to the present
day, taxed the net income of "every corporation,... or association... organized in
191 U.S. CONsT. amend. XVI (creating broad congressional powers to tax).
192 In 1822, New York enacted the first limited partnership statute as an alternative to the
business corporation. The New York statute envisioned two classes of partners: the general
partners who were fully liable and limited partners who only had their capital contibution at risk
Over the following twenty-year period, most states enacted similar statutes as an attempt to slow
the increased use of the business corporation. However, the early limited partnership statutes were
seldom used. See SEAVOY, supra note 110, at 97-98.
193 See infra note 203.
194 Business trusts date back to seventeenth century English trust law and pre-Civil War
references to business trusts in America can be found in Foster v. Goree, 4 Ala. 440 (Ala. 1842)
(trust, executed to secure a debt related to a sale of slave, held valid despite failure to appoint
substitute trustee) and Attorney General v. Proprietors of the Meetingho use, 69 Mass. 1 (1854),
wit of error dismissed, 66 U.S. 262 (1861) (business trust mentioned in dicta). Massachusetts
became the mainstay for business trusts in the nineteenth century, thus donning them with the
name "Massachusetts trusts." In the late nineteenth century, Massachusetts and other state courts
steadily began to recognize the usefulness and validity of business trusts, most courts considering
whether the creditors of a business trust could hold the shareholders liable for judgments obtained.
See Mayo v. Moritz, 24 N.E. 1083, 1083 (Mass. 1890) (trust set up by assignees of an invention
was held to be a separate entity); Phillips v. Blatchford, 137 Mass. 510, 516 (1884); Whitman v.
Porter, 107 Mass. 522, 524 (1871); Ricker v. American Loan and Trust Co., 5 N.E. 284, 288
(Mass. App. Ct. 1885) (considered how to tax an association dealing with railroad stock). Other
state decisions held business trusts valid. See generally Gindrat v. Montgomery Gas Light Co., 2
So. 327 (Ala. 1887) (sale of land to business trustee held valid in ejectment action); Wells-Stone
Mercantile Co. v. Grover, 75 N.W. 911 (N.D. 1898) (debtor and creditors could form business
trust without creditors becoming real proprietors to the trust property); Connally v. Lyons, 18 S.W.
799 (Tex. 1891) (trustee ofimercantile business trust held personally liable for the price of goods
absconded); Robey v. Smith, 30 NE. 1093 (Ind. 1892) (citizens cannot be denied the right to take
property in trust). Despite these court decisions, the Massachusetts legislature, until 1912, did not
accept business trusts as a separate entity. See Massachusetts House Resolves, ch. 56, Resolve to
Provide for an Investigation of Voluntary Associations Organized or Doing Business in this
Commonwealth under Written Instnments or Declarations of Trusts (April 15, 1911); H.R. 1788,
Report of the Special Commission to Investigate Voluntary Associations (January 5, 1913).
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the United States... not including partnerships." Corporations, as well as
unincorporated organizations deemed associations, would bear an entity level tax
just like individuals while partnerships would bear no tax, creating flow-through
taxation to the partners.195 Congress viewed the corporation as an appropriate target
for an income tax due to its formal creation by and recognition as a separate entity
by state issued charters. 196 The ordinary general partnership, viewed as an
inappropriate target for the tax, involved no state law filing and constituted a mere
aggregate of the partners, each facing personal liability exposure with management
and dissolution powers over the partnership.197
Although it took until 1918 for the definition of corporation to clearly articulate
that associations constituted a distinct category needing their own definition, 198 the
modem income tax as enacted in 1913, by creating an entity level tax on all state
law corporations and on at least some unincorporated forms along with no entity
level tax on partnerships, set up the legal foundation eventually leading to the birth
of the LLC more than half a century later. Two principal factors, the IRS's
movement away from imposing the corporate tax if the unincorporated business
offered limited liability dovetailing with the growth of independent oil producers
and their desire to secure limited liability in a partnership business form, explain
why the LLC emerged in the middle 1970s rather than earlier. Before 1960, the
legal requirements imposed by the IRS's regulations simply did not permit business
organizations offering limited liability to qualify for partnership taxation. Moreover,
an analysis of the effective income tax burden from doing business in a corporation
195 See Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114.
196 See 26 CoNG. REC. 6866-67 (1894) (articulating corporation's status as a legal entity
with government protection and privileges as justification for imposing an income tax) (statement
of Sen. Vest); see also Patrick E. Hobbs, Entity Classification: The One-Hundred Year Debate,
44 CATm. L. REv. 437,441,446 (1995) (speculating that the separate income tax on corporations
was implemented solely to "soothe the psyche of the American public").
197 See supra notes 128-29 (discussing early uses and characteristics of partnerships); see
also LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BusINEsS ASSOCIATIONS 1-2 to 1-5, 3-1 to 3-3, 3-10 to 3-21(1983)
(discussing partnership law as it existed in 1914, the time of the Uniform Partnership Act's
codification); EDWARD H. WARREN, CORPORATE ADVANTAGE wm-iour INCORPORATION 17-28
(1929) (comparing and contrasting partnerships to corporations at the turn of the century).
198 The concept of association clearly constituting a separate category first appeared in the
War Profits Excess Tax of 1917. See War Revenue Act, ch. 63, § 200, 40 Stat. 302 (1917)
(defining "corporation" to include 'Joint-stock companies or associations and insurance
companies...'). The Revenue Act of 1918 continued with this approach, defining "corporation"
to include "associations, joint-stock companies, and insurance companies." Revenue Act of 1918,
ch. 18,40 Stat. 1057 (1919). The Revenue Act of 1932 completed the circle of definitions clearly
separating partnerships from associations by defining "partnership" to include "a syndicate, group,
pool, joint venture or other unincorporated organization, through or by means of which any
business, financial operation, or venture is carried on, and which is not, within the meaning of this
Act, a trust or estate or a corporation." Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 111 (aX3), 47 Stat. 169.
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versus a partnership shows that businesses consistently producing taxable income
had no motivation to secure limited liability outside the corporate form until after
the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Before the 1986 Act, only business ventures needing
to pass-through tax losses to investors would benefit from adding the limited
liability feature to a business organization qualifying for partnership taxation, and
a widespread market for these investments did not develop until the early 1970s.
Ultimately, the business conditions of the oil and gas industry leading to an
increased presence of independent producers using partnerships to conduct oil
exploration activities sparked the market for investments, producing flow-through
tax losses, and helped explain the invention of the LLC.
A. Limited Liability Mandated Corporate Taxation Until 1960
Although the modem income tax failed to spell out which business
characteristics distinguished associations from partnerships, until 1960 the presence
of limited liability, evidenced by a state law filing similar to articles of
incorporation, served as regulatory benchmark mandating association treatment.
Other than the corporation, only the limited partnership form offered limited
liability protection by virtue of a state law filing. Undoubtedly, due to the statutory
limited liability protection enjoyed by at least all the limited partners, the first
definition of association as promulgated by Regulation 33 in 1914 simply stated
without explanation that all limited partnerships would be taxed as corporations.199
Starting in 1921 with Regulation 45 through all regulatory amendments until 1940,
limited partnerships could qualify for partnership taxation if the general partner
remained personally liable under state law for the partnership's obligations, and if
a number of other partnership characteristics were present 2 00 However, the strong
presumption in the regulations, treating all doubtful cases as associations, caused
limited partnerships in states statutorily providing general partners limited liability
protection to always be classified as associations thereby subjecting them to the
corporate tax.201 Because limited partnerships granting all partners limited liability
199 See Treas. Reg. No. 33, art. 86 (1914).
200 See Treas. Reg. No. 45, art. 1505 (1921). For additional regulations containing the same
substantive standards as Regulation 45 for testing limited partnerships as partnerships, see Treas.
Reg. 62, art. 1505 (1922); Treas. Reg. 65, art. 1505 (1924); Treas. Reg. 69, art. 1505 (1926); Treas.
Reg. 74, artl 1315 (1929); Treas. Reg. 77, art. 1315 (1933); Treas. Reg. 86, art. 801-6 (1935);
Treas. Reg. 94, art. 1001-6 (1936); Treas. Reg. 101, art. 901-6 (1939). Because limited
partnerships acting as separate entities would be treated as associations, few limited partnerships
would qualify as partnerships. See also Stephen B. Scallen, Federal Income Taxation of
ProfessionalAssociations and Corporations, 49 MINN. L. REV. 603,656-57 (1965) (noting that
few limited partnerships would qualify for partnership taxation).
201 See Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1506 (1921) (defining association characteristics as including
limited liability for the general partner, freely transferable shares, limited partnership's ability to
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protection could not secure partnership taxation, until 1940 the partnership
classification regulations directly imposed formidable obstacles to any new
experimentation that may have resulted in the invention of the LLC.
Starting with Regulation 103 in 1940 through all regulatory amendments until
1960, the criteria distinguishing limited partnerships from associations stopped
using limited liability as a relevant factor. Moreover, the regulations made it easier
for limited partnerships to secure partnership taxation by removing the language
requiring all doubtful cases to be associations. Rather, the regulations focused on the
presence of continuity of existence beyond the life of the original partners, free
transferability of partnership interests and centralized management as pointing to
association status without explicitly tilting doubtful cases one way or the other.202
The regulations probably stopped discussing limited liability as a factor for limited
partnerships because, by 1940, state law had evolved to a point where general
partners consistently faced personal liability exposure.2 03 Because state law
routinely required general partners to bear personal liability and techniques, such as
setting up a minimally capitalized corporate general partner, to substantively
undermine that liability exposure had not yet developed, the limited liability factor
no longer proved useful for testing limited partnerships.204
hold title and bring suits-with all doubtful cases resolved in favor of an association classification).
For additional regulations containing the substantive legal standards that appeared in Regulation
45 related to limited partnerships being classified as associations, see Treas. Reg. 62, art. 1506
(1922); Treas. Reg. 65, art. 1506 (1924); Treas. Reg. 69, art. 1506 (1926); Treas. Reg. 74, art. 1316
(1929); Treas. Reg. 77, art. 1316 (1933); Treas. Reg. 86, art. 801-5 (1935); Treas. Reg. 94, art.
1001-5 (1936); Treas. Reg. 101, art. 901-5 (1939). Limited partnerships offering the general
partner limited liability protection had virtually no chance of securing partnership taxation. The
combination of the liability protection establishing at least one association characteristic and the
"all doubtful cases" language, essentially giving the IRS heavy leeway to impose association
status, made it impossible for these limited partnerships to comfortably rely on being taxed as
partnerships even if other facts negated other association traits.
2 02 See Treas. Reg. 103, art. 19.3797-5 (1940) ("'fthe organization is not interrupted by the
death of a general partner or by a change in the ownership of his participating interest, and if
[management is centralized], it is taxable as a corporation"); Treas. Reg. 111, art. 29.3797-5
(1943); Treas. Reg. 118, art. 39.3797-5 (1951/54).
203 During the period from 1940 to 1960, most limited partnership statutes enacted provided
that the general partner was personally liable. See 43 ALA. CODE § 7 (1940); CAL. CORP. CODE
§§ 15501-15531 (West 1954); 6 DEL. CODEANN. §§ 1701-1712 (1953); FLA. STAT. ch. 620.01-
620.32 (1949); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-101 to 56-121 (1949); MAsS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 109,
§§ 1-31 (1933 & Supp. 1957); MlCH. COMP. LAWS §§ 20.51-20.81 (1936 & supp. 1957); N.J.
REV. STAT. §§ 42:2-1 to 42:2-30 (1937 & Supp. 1941); N.Y. LAws art. 8 § 90-119 (1938 & Supp.
1943); OHIO REV. CODEANN. §§ 8036-8058 (1940); Wis. STAT. §§ 124.01-124.30 (1941).
204 See Hamill, Corporate Integration, supra note 3, at 410-11 (discussing the use of
minimally capitalized corporate general partners to achieve complete limited liability protection
for a limited partnership); Hamill, Partnership Classification, supra note 5, at 585-87, 604-05
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Moreover, from 1940 through 1960, the regulations created a different category
for state law partnership associations in order to apply a separate standard. Without
explicitly referring to any corporate criteria, the regulatory language applicable to
partnership associations clearly state that the statutory provisions of partnership
associations mandate association status.205 Like shareholders of corporations, by
virtue of a state law filing, all members of partnership associations enjoy limited
liability protection.20 6 Apparently, from 1940 until 1960 the presence of limited
liability served as the major dividing point 207 requiring state law partnership
associations to be in a different category than limited partnerships. 08 Because they
no longer offered complete limited liability protection, limited partnerships enjoyed
a realistic opportunity to secure partnership taxation while partnership associations
always faced the corporate tax. Although the post-1940 regulations contain no direct
language to this effect, until 1960 the presence of statutory limited liability
nevertheless remained a critical factor pointing to association status, rendering the
legal environment unsuitable for the LLC.
Although limited liability played a fundamental role in the classification of
limited partnerships and partnership associations, the pre-1960 regulations placed
substantially less weight on limited liability when testing general partnerships and
business trusts for association status. The first definition of association in Regulation
14 simply stated that all general partnerships avoided association classification,209
and without mentioning limited liability, deemed all common law trusts-organized
for commercial or industrial purposes, with shares of interests based on capital or
profits-as corporations for federal income tax purposes.210 Although subsequent
regulatory amendments starting in 1921 lasting until 1960 contemplated taxing
(same).
205 See Treas. Reg. 103, art. 19.3797-6 (1940) (providing that "a partnership
association ... is taxable as corporation"T); Treas. Reg. 111, art. 293797-6 (1943); Treas. Reg. 118,
art. 39.3797-6 (1951/54).
206 See 59 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 171-484 (1936); NJ. REV. STAT. §§ 42:3-1 to 42:3-30 (1937
& Supp. 1941); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 20.91-20.106 (1936 & Supp. 1957); OHO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 8059-8078 (1940); sources cited atsupra notes 199-201 (pre-1940 regulations refer to
partnership association statutes in these four states); see also Letter from Robert L. Hartig to Tom
Fink, Alaska state representative (Mar. 14, 1975) (referring to the above four statutes in support
of the pending Alaska LLC legislation).
207 See supra notes 205, 206 (partnership associations automatically taxed as associations
and enjoy limited liability protection under state law).
20 8 Prior to 1940, state law partnership associations were lumped into the rules that tested
limited partnerships for association status, leaving open the theoretical, but not practical, possibility
of securing partnership status. See supra notes 199-201.
20 9 See Treas. Rig., art. 94(1914).
2 10 See Treas. Reg. 33, arts. 57,58 (1918). This Regulation, promulgated in 1914, failed to
discuss the classification of business trusts.
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some general partnerships as associations, limited liability never appeared as an
explicit factor relevant to association status.211 Starting in 1921 and continuing until
1935, the regulations, although still not discussing limited liability, allowed trusts
holding property for the collection and distribution of rents, where the trustee
possessed no other significant managerial powers, to enjoy a safe harbor avoiding
association status. All other business trusts still conclusively faced the corporate
tax.212 Although Regulation 86, in 1935 and all subsequent amendments until 1960,
revised the standards for classifying business trusts by adding limited liability to the
relevant factors, the presence of limited liability never became a critical feature
mandating association classification for business trusts. 2 13
The IRS's failure to refer to limited liability as the most important association
factor in the context of general partnerships and business trusts does not negate the
central importance of limited liability for determining association status in the pre-
1960 period. The IRS undoubtedly deemed it unnecessary to explicitly treat general
partnerships offering limited liability as associations because state law exposes all
general partners to personal liability for the debts of the partnership and techniques,
such as the creation of corporate intermediaries, undermining that liability exposure
had not yet developed.214 Similarly, in the earliest regulations, the IRS probably
deemed it unnecessary to use limited liability to any degree when classifying
business trusts due to the personal liability exposure of the trust participants under
state law. However, once the use of business trusts became more sophisticated by
the early 1920s, the IRS undoubtedly noticed contractual mechanisms providing
partial limited liability protection to trust participants. This technique, which was
ineffective against involuntary creditors, for example tort creditors, contractually
required the trust itself to bear all debts and not to hold the trust participants
211 See Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1503 (1921) (focusing on free transferability and centralized
management; limited liability never a factor); Treas. Reg. 62, art. 1503 (1922); Treas. Reg. 65, art.
1503 (1924); Treas. Reg. 69, art. 1503 (1926); Treas. Reg. 77, art. 1313 (1933); Treas. Reg. 86,
art. 801-4 (1935); Treas. Reg. 94, art. 1001-4 (1936); Treas. Reg. 101, art. 901-4 (1939); Treas.
Reg. 103, art. 19.3797-4 (1940); Treas. Reg. 111, art. 29.3797-4 (1943); Treas. Reg. 118, art.
39.3797-4 (1951/54).
2 12 See Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1504 (1921) (focusing on trustee's role as a business manager,
limited liability never mentioned); Treas. Reg. 62, art. 1504 (1922) (same); Treas. Reg. 65, art.
1504 (1924) (same); Treas. Reg. 69, art. 1504 (1926) (same); Treas. Reg. 74, art. 1314 (1929)
(same); Treas. Reg. 77, art. 1314 (1933) (same).
2 13 See Treas. Reg. 86, art. 801-3 (1935); Treas. Reg 94, art. 1001-3 (1936); Treas. Reg. 101,
art. 901-3 (1938); Treas. Reg. 103, art. 19.3797-3 (1940); Treas. Reg. 111, art. 3797-3 (1943);
Treas. Reg. 118, art. 39-3797-3 (1953-1960).
2 14 See Uniform Partnership Act § 15(b) (1914) (all partners personally liable); see also
Hamill, Corporate Integration, supra note 3, at 410-11 (discussing corporate intermediaries
creating limited liability protection for partners).
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personally liable.2 15 The increased presence of this technique explains why limited
liability appeared as a relevant factor for classifying trusts by 1935. However,
because the contractual protection only partially covered the trust participants, the
IRS perhaps deemed it unnecessary to make limited liability a superfactor requiring
association status for trusts. Consequently, despite the minor role played by limited
liability in classifying general partnerships and business trusts, the pre-1960
partnership classification regulations would have nevertheless conclusively taxed
the LLC as a corporation due to the absolute limited liability protection provided by
the state law filing.
Ironically, by overhauling the partnership classification regulations in 1960, the
IRS forged the legal path that led to the LLC's invention less than twenty years
later. In order to deny professional groups the association status necessary for
pension benefits, available at that time only to businesses taxed as corporations, the
IRS radically changed the regulations to make it considerably more difficult for
unincorporated organizations to come under the association category.l 6 The 1960
regulations mechanically gave each of the four corporate characteristics, among
them limited liability, equal weight. The literal terms of the 1960 regulations
permitted an unincorporated business offering limited liability to secure partnership
classification provided that at least two of the remaining three corporate
characteristics were not present.217
2 15 Trust participants generally can be held personally liable either in their capacity as
owners or managers (for example, trustees with no beneficial interest). See generally GUY
THOMPsoN, BusINEss TUSTS AS SUBSTITuTS FOR BUSINESS CORPORATIONS 36 (1920) (citing
Taylor vs. Davis, 110 U.S. 330 (1884)); sources cited at supra note 194. By the 1920s, a
contractual technique providing partial liability protection evolved where the trustee uses the trust
instrument to formally declare (while giving proper notice) the trust to be solely liable for all
business debts. See id. at 36-37. Interestingly enough, this same advice exists today. See generally
Sheldon A. Jones et al., The Massachusetts Business Trust and Registered lnveshnent Companies,
13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 421 (1988). Moreover, unlike corporate statutes covering directors, many
business trust statutes do not explicitly permit the trustee to be indemnified for bad business
decisions. See id. at 433 (citing Mass Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 182); see also Richard F. Barrett & Jean
E. deValpine, Taxation ofBusiness Trusts and Other Unincorporated Massachusetts Entities with
Transferable Shares, 40 BOST. U. LAW REV. 329 (1960) (discussing business advantages offered
by the Massachusetts business trust that, under pre-1960 law, were often outweighed by tax
uncertainties, especially at the federal level).
2 16 See Hamill, Partnership Classification, supra note 5, at 573 (discussing 1960 regulations
as a response to United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954), where a group of
physicians operating in a state law partnership secured association status under the 1953
regulations with the court upholding the classification and the desired pension benefits.
Subsequently, the states widely adopted professional incorporation statutes to allow these groups
to directly receive the pension benefits).
2 17 See supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing Wyoming LLC statute that literally
complies with the requirements of the 1960 regulations).
[Vol. 59:14591508
LIMITED LABILITY COMPANY ORIGINS
B. Effective Income Tax Burdens Largely Favored Corporations Until
1986
In order to analyze the timing of the LLC's invention following the 1960
regulations, the perspective of two groups of business activities must be considered.
Some business ventures expect to incur tax losses in the early years of operation and
prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the need to pass-through these losses to
investors effectively necessitated securing partnership classification for the business
entity. Corporations subject to the two-tiered tax will always be unsuitable because
the early losses will be trapped at the corporate level. The S corporation, offering
a pass-through regime with superficial appeal, will also be an unsuitable choice for
these business ventures due to its many restrictions, the most devastating being the
rules denying shareholders of S corporations an increase in stock basis for shares of
the corporation's third party debt.218 The needs of business ventures expecting to
consistently recognize taxable income, making the pass-through of early losses
irrelevant, are far more complex. The comparative income tax burden between
doing business in a partnership or corporation greatly affects the business entity
choice. Because of the flow-through model of taxation, the income tax burden on
individuals globally represents the tax cost of doing business in a partnership or S
corporation, while the income tax burden on corporations measures the tax cost of
doing business in a C corporation. Despite the technical presence of the corporate
tax, the combination of lower corporate rates and preferential treatment of capital
gains, as well as other corporate oriented preferences, may actually result in
businesses consistently recognizing taxable income bearing less tax from operating
in a C corporation.219
Until 1958, the comparative income tax burdens faced by individuals and
corporations discouraged many businesses recognizing significant taxable income
from choosing partnerships or S corporations. A comparison of the effective income
tax rates220 from 1913 until 1958 indicates that the C corporations consistently
enjoyed greater tax savings than individuals reporting distributive shares of income
2 18 See Hamill, Possible Choice, supra note 2, at 754 (discussing advantages of partnership
taxation over subchapter S taxation); ROBERT E. SWANSON & BARBARA MARDiNLY SWANSON,
TAX SHELTERS: A GUIDE FOR INVESTORS AND THEIR ADvISORS 40-41 (1982) (subchapter S
corporation fails to provide an appropriate form for tax shelter investments).
2 19 See infra notes 222-28; see also BORIS I. BrrTKER & JAMES S. EusrIcE, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 5.01[5] (1994) (stating that the
corporate form may be advantageous over pass-through entities when the maximum corporate tax
rate is lower than the maximum individual rate and capital gains preferences exist).
220 See the Appendix to this Article for a discussion of mechanical calculations and
assumptions made when interpreting the data related to the effective income tax burdens bome by
individuals and corporations.
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from partnerships and S corporations.2 21 For most of the years222 following the
Revenue Act of 1918,223 individuals faced a top nominal income tax rate exceeding
fifty percent and, from 1944 until the early 1960s, the highest nominal rate on
individual income exceeded ninety percent.2 24 Despite tax planning opportunities
mitigating the actual tax rates, individuals still suffered a significantly higher overall
effective income tax rate than the comparable rate imposed on corporations.225 On
221 As already noted, partnerships have always offered flow-through taxation. Congress
enacted subchapter S in 1958 to provide parity between partnerships and small business
corporations. Although the flow-through treatment to shareholders generally achieved this goal,
S corporations faced many restrictions not applicable to partnerships. See S. Rep. No. 1983, 85th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 87 (1958), reprinted in 1958-3 CB 922, 1137. In 1982 Congress overhauled
subehapter S. See Pub. L. No. 85-866, 72 Stat. 1606, 1658 (1982). In 1996 Congress made
additional changes. See Small Business and Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110
Stat. 1755. Both pieces of legislation greatly improved subchapter S but failed to provide parallel
treatment with partnerships.
222 See generally Appendix to this Article. For the years 1925 to 1931, the highest individual
nominal income tax rate was 25%, while the highest nominal corporate tax rate averaged less than
13%. Although the differential between the individual and corporate nominal rates equaled
approximately 12%, the differential between the individual and corporate effective rates only
amounted to a little more than 4%. See STATISTICS OF INCOME Div., INTERNALREVENUE SERVICE,
STATISTICS OF INCOME: 1925-1931, CORPORATION INCOME TAX REURNS (each year in separate
books); STATISTICS OF INCOME DIV., INTERNALREVENUE SERVICE, STATISIcs OF INCOME: 1925-
193 1, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS (each year in separate books).
223 See generally Appendix to this Article. For the years 1913 to 1917, the highest nominal
rate for individuals was 7%, 7%, 7%, 15%, and 67%, respectively. The highest effective rate for
these years was approximately 1%, 1%, 1.5%, 11%, and 35.5%, respectively. See STATISTCS OF
INCOME Div., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME: 1913-1917, INDIVmUAL
INCOME TAX RErURNS (each year in separate books).
2 2 4 See STATISTICS OF INCOME Div., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME:
1944-1963, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS (each year in separate books); see also Appendix
to this Article.
225 See generally Appendix to this Article. From 1913 to 1916, the highest effective rates for
corporations averaging approximately 1.25% showed a lower overall burden than the comparable
rate on individuals showing an approximate 3.5% average. See STATISTICS OF INCOME DIV.,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISICS OF INCOME: 1913-1916, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
RERsRNS (each year in separate books); STATISICS OF INCOMEDiV., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
STATISTICS OF INCOME: 1913-1916, CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURNS (each year in separate
books). This pattern continued in 1917 as corporations rose to 20% while individuals rose further
to 36%. See STATISTICS OF INCOME DIV., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME:
1917, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS; STATISTICS OF INCOME DIV., INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME: 1917, CORPORATION INCOME TAX REIURNS. From 1918 to 1924,
corporations averaging approximately 18% continued to bear less tax burden than individuals
averaging approximately 49%. See STATISTICS OF INCOME DIV., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
STATISTICS OF INCOME: 1918-1924, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS (each year in separate
books); STATISTICS OF INCOME DIV., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATSrICS OF INCOME: 1918-
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the corporate side,226 for most of the years2 27 from 1918 to 1958, the highest
effective rate remained well under fifty percent, and in many years dipped below
fifteen percent.228 Because the C corporation actually offered lower costs when
measuring the actual tax burden, than the comparable burden faced by individuals
using partnerships, until 1958 businesses expecting to produce significant taxable
income had no motivation to look beyond the corporate form to obtain limited
liability and therefore were highly unlikely to invent or support the LLC.
From 1958 until 1973, the comparative effective tax burdens borne by
individuals and corporations shifted with corporations shouldering a slightly higher
burden. During this time, the highest effective tax rates on individuals remained
between forty-four and forty-eight percent, with the highest corporate effective tax
rates consistently higher by approximately three percentage points.229 From 1974
1924, CORPORATION INCOME TAX RMRNS (each year in separate books). See supra note 222,
for the effective rate comparison for the years 1925 to 1931. From 1932 to 1949, the pattern
continued with corporations averaging approximately 31% while individuals averaged
approximately 61%. See STATISTICS OF INCOME DIV., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS
OF INCOME: 1932-1949, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS (each year in separate books);
STATISTICS OF INCOME Div., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME: 1932-1949,
CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURNS (each year in separate books). From 1950 to 1957,
corporations still bore less of a tax burden averaging approximately 48% with individuals
averaging approximately 58%. See STATISTICS OF INCOME Div., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
STATISTICS OF INCOME: 1950-1957, NDVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS (each year in separate
books); STATISTICS OF INCOME Div., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME: 1950-
1957, CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURNS (each year in separate books). In 1958, for the first
time in modem income tax history, corporations incurred a higher effective income tax rate than
individuals. From 1958 to 1963, the highest effective rates for corporations averaged
approximately 51% while the individuals highest effective rates averaged approximately 48%,
giving an average rate differential of 3%. See STATISTICS OF INCOME DIV., INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME: 1958-1963, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS (each year in
separate books); STATISTICS OF INCOME DIV., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF
INCOME: 1958-1963, CORPORATION INCOMETAX RETURNS (each year in separate books).
2 26 See generally Appendix to this Article.
2 27 See generally Appendix to this Article. The effective rate for corporations went above
50% in 1940, 1943 to 1944, and 1951 to 1953. See STATISTICS OF INCOME Div., INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME: 1940,1943-1944,1951-1953, CORPORATION INCOME
TAX RETURNS (each year in separate books).
22 8 See generally Appendix to this Article. The effective rate for corporations fell below 15%
for the years 1922 to 1939. See STATISTICS OF INCOME Div., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
STATISTICS OF INCOME: 1922-1939, CORPORATION INCOMETAX REURNS (each year in separate
books).
2 29 See generally Appendix to this Article. From 1958 to 1973, the highest effective rates for
corporations averaged approximately 48.5% while the individuals' highest effective rates averaged
approximately 45.5%, giving an average rate differential of a mere 3%. See STATISTICS OF INCOME
DIV., INrERNALREVENUESERVICE,STATISncsOFINCOME: 1958-1973,INDIViDUALINCOMETAX
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
until the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the highest effective tax rates shifted again,
causing individuals to bear a higher tax burden. During these years, the corporate
effective rates remained between thirty-five and forty-five percent with the
individual effective rates consistently higher, but only by approximately four
percentage points 230 Because from 1958 through 1986 the gap between the
individual and corporate highest effective tax rates remained consistently narrow,
the overall tax burdens of doing business neither encouraged nor discouraged the
use of C corporations over partnerships or S corporations. Because the corporation
represented a well established and understood choice for doing business and posed
a tax burden roughly commensurate with the partnership forms, businesses
expecting to recognize significant taxable income still had no motivation to obtain
limited liability outside the corporate form by inventing or supporting the LLC.
C. Business Prototypes Contributing to the Development ofLLCs
As already noted, until Congress enacted the Tax Reform Act of 1986, only
business ventures expecting significant tax losses in the early years of operation had
any motivation to create and support the LLC, and until the 1960s the IRS's
regulations posed a legal barrier to the LLC achieving partnership taxation.
Although business activity producing flow-through tax losses can be traced all the
way back to the first modem income tax, a significant market for these investments
did not fully develop until the early 1970s.2 31 Fueled by an enormous demand for
crude oil erupting in the early 1970s, the significant market for investments
featuring early tax losses started with sales of partnership interests in oil and gas
ventures sponsored by independent oil producers. Partnership interests in
RETuRNs (each year in separate books); STATIsTICS OF INCOME Div., INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE, STATISTICs OF INCOME: 1958-1973, CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETuRNS (each year
in separate books).
230 See generally Appendix to this Article. From 1974 to 1986, the highest effective rates for
corporations averaged approximately 39.5% while the individuals' highest effective rates averaged
approximately 43.5%, giving an average rate differential of a mere 4%. See STATISTICS OF INCOME
Div., INTERNALREVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME: 1974-1986, INDIDUAL INCOME TAX
RErms (each year in separate books); STATISTICS OF INCOME DIV., INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME: 1974-1986, CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETjRNS (each year
in separate books). Although during this period corporations incurred lower effective rates than
individuals by a differential of approximately 4%, this differential was well below the advantages
corporations faced in their glory years prior to 1958, when their effective tax rates were
significantly lower than the comparable rates on individuals. See supra notes 222-28.
231 See SwANSON & SWANSON, supra note 218, at 2-5 (investments featuring flow-through
tax losses traced back to the Sixteenth Amendment have always been available; fervent use of
these investments in the 1960s and early 1970s brought to the spot light). See generally Orrisch
v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 395 (1970) (discussing 1966 and 1967 taxable years where IRS successfully
invalidated special allocations of depreciation to a partner due to no economic effect).
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independent oil exploration ventures were the most popular securities offering in the
early 1970s, promising both flow-through tax losses in the early years and the
possibility of tremendous profits, provided that the exploration activity resulted in
a substantial oil find.232 Although LLCs could have theoretically appeared any time
after 1960, the spotty market for partnership investments rendered any significant
LLC experimentation highly unlikely until the early 1970s. Moreover, because an
independent oil producer, Hamilton Brothers Oil Company created the LLC in
1975, the business conditions of the oil and gas industry, particularly the growth of
independent producers conducting oil exploration in partnerships, greatly contribute
towards understanding the LLC's invention from a global perspective.
Oil and gas exploration went through a number of developments throughout the
twentieth century leading to the substantial growth of independent oil explorers
operating in partnerships by the early 1970s. The rapidly changing business climate
in the early twentieth century involved heavy increases in the consumption of
energy, causing the oil and gas industry to rise in importance.233 For example, the
growth of the automobile and the electrical power industries234 fueled the early
twentieth century economy after World War 1235 up to the Depression of the
1930s.236 From World War II through the 1970s, industries requiring greater
232 See Lewis G. Mosburg, Jr., Regulation of Tax Shelter Investments, 25 OKLA. L. REV. 207
(1972); ALAN J.B. ARONSON, PARTNERSHIP INCOME TAXES 9-11 (1978); Jerome Kurtz,
Commissioner's Remarks on Abusive Tax Shelter Issues, 55 TAXES 774 &n.12 (1977); Madlyn
M. Harrell & Richard J. Stricof, Overview ofAn Oil and Gas Tax Shelter, 28 OIL & GAS TAX Q.
496 (discussing IRS tax shelter audit program beginning in 1973 aimed particularly at oil and gas
tax exploration ventures that later expanded to include other business activities producing flow
through tax losses).
233 See HAROLD F. WILLIAMSON ETAL., THE AMERICAN PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, THE AGE
OF ENERGY 1899-1959, at 648-72, 795-821 (1963) (discussing the growing importance of the oil
and gas industry).
234 See GARYM. WALTON & HUGH ROCKOFF, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY456-
58 (6th ed. 1990). The economy of the 1920s thrived with the automobile leading the way. From
1921 to 1929 car production rose from 1.5 million to 4.8 million cars, resulting in one out of every
six Americans owning an automobile. Additionally, a rise in electrical appliance use further
stimulated the economy. Homes with radios increased from 3 million in 1922 to nearly 10 million
by the end of the decade, resulting in mass advertising. The increase in advertising, coupled with
the growth of installment purchasing, further fueled the economy as consumer consumption
boomed. See id.
235 See id. at 441-45, 518 (stating that American business enjoyed great profitability
supplying wartime goods to Europe at the beginning of World War I, and by the close of the war,
the country's days as a debtor had ended; in particular, the manufacturing industry reaped large
profits as it supplied the war efforts).
236 See id. at 454-74,478-95 (stating that U.S. business enjoyed prosperity during the 1920s
as the world continued to change and technological advances introduced a new array of consumer
goods, including widespread availability of the automobile).
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consumption of oil and gas, especially the transportation industry, steadily
increased, thus resulting in a steady rise in demand for crude oil throughout that
period.2 37 Participants in the oil and gas industry used both the corporate and
partnership forms. The major oil producers conducted worldwide operations and,
at least until the late 1960s, engaged in all phases of the industry, including oil
exploration, refining, and marketing.2 38 The major oil producers used corporations
with multiple subsidiaries to conduct their business activities.2 39 The independent
oil producers,240 whose primary business activity involved exploring for and
developing oil and gas reserves to sell to third parties, used flow-through business
forms qualifying for partnership taxation to conduct oil exploration activities.241
Although the independent oil and gas explorers discovered a number of oil and
gas deposits over the course of the twentieth century, prior to the late 1960s no
widespread market supported a large number of independent drillers because the
237 See id. at 456-57,618-20,637 (stating that increases in the automobile industry fueled
other related industries including steel, rubber, plate glass, and petroleum. The Post-War period
also saw tremendous growth in the airline industry as the number of federal flight routes increased
from 57,000 miles in 1949 to 220,000 miles by 1960. The percentage of GNP for transportation
industry as a whole grew from approximately 7.6% in 1959 to 9.2% by 1979); WILLAMSON,
supra note 223, at 796, 804-06 (stating that during the fifteen year period following World War
11, demand for petroleum products exploded, increasing by 80%).
238 Traditionally, the oil and gas industry divides the participants into either the major oil
companies which produce, refine, and market oil and gas or independent oil and gas companies,
which basically explore for and produce oil and gas for sale to third parties. See JOHN M. BLAIR,
THE CONTROL OF OIL, at ix-xi, 235-37 (1976) (discussing the structure of the oil industry and
integrated firms which engage all levels of industry activity and can be classified as production,
refining, and marketing). See generally ANTHONY SAMPSON, THE SEVEN SISTERS: THE GREAT OIL
COMPANIES AND THE WORLD THEY MADE (1975) (providing the history of the largest major oil
companies-known as the Seven Sisters and their involvement in the world oil markets).
239 See SAMPSON, supra note 238, at 5-17 (discussing the operations of the Seven Sisters as
corporations); BLAIR, supra note 238, at 128-51 (discussing general references to the corporate
operations among the large players in the oil industry).
240 Independent oil producers do not normally engage in refining or marketing. As a group,
independent oil producers have made several important discoveries throughout the twentieth
century and are most closely identified with "independent wildcatters.' See BLAIR, supra note 238,
at 125-28. See generally JEAN-FRANCOIS G. LANDEAU, STRATEGIES OF INDEPENDENT OIL
COMPANIES ABROAD (1977) (discussing and analyzing oil producers which were among the
largest oil producers moving abroad following World War II).
241 See supra notes 14-24 and accompanying text; supra notes 231,232 and accompanying
text; see also Exhibits A & E to Frank M. Burke, Jr. Letter Dated March 25, 1993 Regarding
History of Internal Revenue Service Ruling Position Regarding Limited Liability Companies
(discussing desire of oil and gas exploration activities to be conducted in a flow through
partnership form with limited liability).
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worldwide crude oil supply needs were largely being met by other sources.242 The
primary purchasers of crude oil, the major oil producers, either conducted their own
exploration activities or secured their supply from foreign sources. Because the
foreign oil supply steadily became easier and less expensive to obtain, the major oil
producers of the United States grew increasingly dependent on foreign oil from the
1940s through the 1970s.243 Although throughout this period the government
imposed quotas and other rules in order to limit the amount of foreign source oil
imported into the U.S., 44 rather than purchase additional supplies from independent
producers, many of the major oil producers obtained the bulk of their crude oil
needs from their own exploration after exceeding their foreign quota. However, by
the late 1960s, when many of the major producers had scaled back their drilling
operations because they could obtain virtually all their supply needs from foreign
sources at a lesser cost 2 4 5 the relationship with the Middle Eastern governments
242 See BLAIR, supra note 238, at 129 (stating that as late as 1973, 93.6% of all domestic
proved oil reserves were held by twenty major oil companies with almost 66% held by the top
eight and 37% held by the top four).
243 Before 1940 the major oil producers secured most of their crude oil needs by conducting
their own domestic drilling projects. In the 1940s, for the first time, crude oil supply needs heavily
relied on foreign sources. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 233, at 810, 818-19 (stating that total
world oil supply from U.S. fields decreased from 67% in 1945 to less than 40% by 1959, while
in 1948, the U.S., for the first time, became a net minerals oils importer as the percentage of
imports compared to total oil supply began a steady increase over the next fifteen year period);
SAMPSON, supra note 238, at 58-86 (stating that prior to 1940, operations focused upon self
sufficiency).
244 oil policies consistently revolved around ensuring an adequate supply for domestic
consumption. Fears of impending oil shortages resulted in government policies that encouraged
domestic companies to move overseas for exploration and oil production. From the late 1920s
throughout the 1930s, discoveries of large domestic oil fields, including the East Texas oil field,
led to a change in government policy encouraging domestic companies to stop relying on foreign
sources. As the U.S. faced World War I, the government once again changed its policy and
encouraged the use of foreign oil sources to fulfill wartime demand. Throughout the 1940s and the
early 1950s, the largest oil producers voluntarily limited their oil production from all sources to
avoid excess supply flooding the market. By the mid 1950s, voluntary restraints on production
clearly failed to be effective as evidenced by a tremendous increase in the number ofoil companies
going overseas and resulting in further increases of foreign source oil in the U.S. markets. By
1959, President Eisenhower implemented a mandatory import control program that essentially
remained in place, experiencing a number of changes overtime. See generalli ARTHUR M.
JOHNSON, Tm CLLLENGE OF CHANGE: THE SUN OIL COMPANY, 1945-1977, at 99-124 (1983);
BLAIR, supra note 238, at 171-81.
24 5 See BLAIR, supra note 238, at 218-20, 246-48 (discussing the changing market, which
results in greater concentration on the marketing and refining end of operations and focused less
on the crude production end, and providing a general discussion of vertical integration and the
ability of the major producers to achieve self sufficiency); see also SIAMACK SHOJAI & BERNARD
S. KATZ, THE OIL MARKET IN THE 1980s: A DECADE OF DECLINE 116-20 (1992) (discussing
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controlling the foreign oil sources deteriorated, culminating in the Oil Embargo
Crisis of 1973, which led to severe limits on oil supplies from foreign sources
throughout the 1970.246
The increasing level of dependence on foreign oil throughout the last half of the
twentieth century, followed by the abrupt and severe reduction of that supply by the
early 1970s, forced the major oil producers and other participants in the oil industry
to seek crude oil from alternative sources.2 47 This need for oil outside traditional
Middle Eastern sources created a market for greater numbers of independent oil
producers than had ever existed in prior years. From the late 1960s through the
1970s, the number of independent oil producers engaging in oil exploration
activities to meet the general increase in demand for crude oil in the United States
and the world grew rapidly.248 In order to secure the necessary capital to conduct
drilling operations, many of these independent producers sold partnership interests
to investors which, in addition to meeting the oil supply needs created by the foreign
sources drying up, started the widespread market for partnership syndications in the
early 1970s.249
Hamilton Brothers Oil Company, being an independent oil producer, had the
incentive to seek a business form that combined limited liability and partnership
changes in the operations of major oil companies including the increased emphasis on the
marketing and refining end of operations as compared to the upstream operations, which is the
production end).
246 See WALTON & ROCKOFF, supra note 234, at 614-15. Due to OPEC gaining the
dornifnant share of the world oil market in 1973, it began attempting to influence oil prices.
Following the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, an embargo was implemented as Arab producers halted
oil sales to countries backing Israel, resulting in a sharp increase in oil prices. During the period
beginning in 1978 and can-ying into 1979, Iran reduced oil output pushing oil prices higher. A
conflict between Iran and Iraq followed extending the upward trend in oil prices. During the
eighteen month period encompassing these events, the price of oil increased by approximately
140%. See SHOJAI & KATZ, supra note 245, at 31-32.
247 See SHOJAI & KATZ, supra note 245, at 75-76. United States oil production reached its
apex in 1970 even as old wells began to run dry and a strict system of price controls discouraged
any new exploration and development During the first three years of the 1970s, United States
production declined somewhat resulting in the Soviet Union supplanting the United States as the
world's largest oil producer by 1973. However, the price increase resulting from the 1973 embargo
spurred mass investment into Alaska-the new hope for American oil. See id.
24 8 By the early 1970s, the independent oil companies' share of United States existing wells
being explored and developed had clearly exploded to new high levels with the independents
drilling the majority of the domestic wells. By 1985, the dominance enjoyed by the independent
oil drillers reached an apex as the independents accounted for 84% of the exploratory and
developed domestic wells. It has been estimated that during this period of increased independent
activity, the number of independents actively drilling peaked at approximately 15,000 separate
enterprises. See id. at 116-18.
249 See supra notes 231,232 and accompanying text.
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taxation. Although the rise of independent oil producers in the early 1970s best
explains the invention of the LLC from a global perspective and bears a close
relationship to the actual facts,. theoretically a number of other business interests
also could have invented the LLC. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, other business
activities, for example the development of real estate, had assumed a significant
presence in the market of offering interests in partnerships promising flow-through
tax losses in the early years of operation.2 50 IfHamilton Brothers Oil Company had
not already invented the LLC, the real estate syndication industry might have had
this first opportunity. However, by the time these other types of business ventures
visibly entered the partnership syndication market Hamilton Brothers Oil Company
had already invented the LLC, but was unable to secure the necessary partnership
classification from the IRS. 251 Ultimately, the LLC provided no benefit to the
independent oil producers or any other business interests offering flow-through tax
losses. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, most of these syndications obtained
limited liability on a substantive level by using a limited partnership with a
minimally capitalized corporate general partner. 252 Investments where the flow-
through of tax losses constituted a material feature remained popular until the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 enacted the passive activity loss rules, which materially limited
the ability of most investors to use flow-through losses and destroyed the market for
these investments.253
Although the spark igniting the LLC's birth came from an independent oil and
gas company seeking U.S. partnership tax status and limited liability under
circumstances where the ability to pass-through losses carried importance, the
support responsible for its later rise following the 1988 Wyoming Revenue Ruling
came from business ventures expecting to consistently recognize taxable income.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986, in addition to destroying the market for partnership
syndications, materially increased the tax burden imposed on corporations. 2 54 From
1987 until 1992, the highest individual effective tax rates stayed between twenty-
four and twenty-eight percent while the comparative corporate rates remained well
over thirty percent. This significant gap, peaking in 1990 with a spread of over
eleven percent strongly discouraged business ventures from operating in C
corporations.255 Business ventures expecting significant taxable income, which also
2 50 See supra notes 231,232; see also Hamill, Partnership Classification, supra note 5, at
574.
251 See supra notes 28, 33 and accompanying text.
252 See Hamill, Partnership Classification, supra note 5, at 573-74.
253 See General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Star.
2085 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 Act Bluebook]; see also Hamill, Partnership Classiftication, supra
note 5, at 575-77; Hamill, Corporate Integration, supra note 3, at 427, n.164.
254 See 1986 Act Bluebook, supra note 253, at 209-50,271-74, 328-55.
255 See generally Appen dix to this Article. From 1987 to 1992, the highest effective rates for
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wished to obtain direct statutory limited liability without facing the restrictions
inherent in a subchapter S election,256 had, for the first time, strong reasons to
support the LLC. On behalf of many clients conducting business in ventures
recognizing substantial taxable income, the second group of LLC proponents
pushed for more flexibility on the partnership classification front and encouraged
the states to enact statutes.2 57 By the time changes in the tax rates in 1993 mitigated
the burden faced by corporations, 58 the race among the states to enact LLC statutes
was well underway. By the end of 1992, the furor to pass an LLC statute stampeded
across the country, strongly resembling the movement of the states to enact general
incorporation statutes during the middle decades of the nineteenth century and the
competition among the states to produce the best general incorporation statute in the
early twentieth century.259
V. CONCLUSION AND EPILOGUE
The origins of the LLC can be traced to several sources. The earliest origin goes
back to the cementing of the American corporation under state, rather than federal,
control during the Jacksonian period of Antebellum America. Throughout
America's legal history, federal and state power to incorporate business has always
been concurrent, with state exercise overwhelmingly prevalent. This state
prevalence materially contributed to the state legislature forum to receive the LLC
in the last quarter of the twentieth century. The triumph of state law control over
corporations averaged approximately 34.5% while the individuals' highest effective rates averaged
approximately 25.5%, giving an average rate differential of 9%. This was clearly more significant
than the 3% and 4% spreads between 1958 and 1973. For years 1986 to 1992, the highest effective
rate for corporations was approximately 36%, 36%, 33%, 33%, 35%, 34%, and 34%, respectively.
The highest effective rate for individuals these years was approximately 38%, 28%, 25%, 24%,
24%, 26%, and 27%. See STATISTICS OF INCOME DIV., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS
OF INCOME: 1986-1992, INDIvIuAL INCOME TAX RETuRNs (each year in separate books);
STATISTICS OF INCOME DIV., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATIsTICs OF INCOME: 1986-1992,
CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURNS (each year in separate books).
256 Of the many restrictions distinguishing S corporations from partnerships, the single class
of stock requirement and the general shareholder restrictions probably cause the most trouble for
complex business ventures expecting to recognize significant taxable income. See Hamill,
Corporate Integration, supra note 3, at 407-09.
257 See supra notes 44-100 and accompanying text.
258 The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 increased the highest nominal rate for
individuals to 39.6% while leaving the corporate rate at 34%. See Revenue Reconciliation Act of
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 416.
259 See supra notes 167, 170-72 (discussing states enacting their first general incorporation
statutes in the nineteenth century); supra notes 186-88 (discussing the early twentieth century
"race to the bottom" among the states to enact the most business-friendly general incorporation
statute).
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corporations was not inevitable. Had the process of issuing colonial charters stayed
with the British Crown, rather than passing to the colonial assemblies, the
experience of issuing corporate charters may not have started the tradition leading
to state rather than federal control. If James Madison's proposal at the Constitutional
Convention, explicitly recognizing some congressional powers to issue corporate
charters, had been passed, he may have been comfortable with the constitutionality
of the Bonus Bill of 1817. The failed Bonus Bill was the last chance for Congress
to assume general powers over corporate charters. Had the Bonus Bill passed,
corporate history might have taken a different turn, imagining an implementation
involving massive congressional charters steering the general practice to federally-
based charters. Finally, the invention of the state law based general incorporation
statutes during the Jacksonian period was not preordained. The true representatives
of the farmers and the laborers, rather than attacking incorporation by special
charter, could have attacked the legitimacy of the corporation itself, which would
have radically redirected business development in ways difficult to imagine given
the corporation's dominant place in American business by the early twentieth
century.
The LLC's more recent origins come from the twentieth century's disparate
business tax regime accorded partnerships and corporations, the comparative tax
burdens of doing business in those forms arising out of that system, and the peculiar
policies of the IRS conceming the impact of statutory limited liability on the ability
to achieve partnership classification. The IRS singlehandedly prevented LLC
experimentation before 1960, and, through its own regulations, set the legal stage
for the LLC's invention after 1960. Once the legal landscape allowed for the
combination of limited liability and partnership classification, the LLC could
emerge. Before the 1986 Tax Reform Act; business ventures-where the ability to
pass-through tax losses constituted a major goal-were significantly more likely to
experiment with the LLC. After the 1986 Act, only those business ventures
expecting to recognize substantial taxable income would be motivated to promote
LLCs. From a global perspective both types of business ventures materially
contributed to the [LC developing as the mainstream choice for doing business. The
first type in fact made the first move by inventing the LLC and forcing the IRS to
openly deal with the LLC's ability to be taxed as a partnership while the second
type, after the 1988 Wyoming Revenue Ruling, pushed the IRS to free the LLC
from the technical partnership classification rules and carried the LLC movement
across the states.
Both Congress and the IRS have always possessed the power to tax LLCs as
corporations. 260 Rather than stop the use of LLCs by explicitly deeming statutory
limited liability a superfactor mandating corporate taxation, Congress and the IRS
260 See supra note 37; see also Hamill, Corporate Integration, supra note 3, at 428-29, 435,
438 (discussing 1987 language conclusively taxing publicly traded partnerships as associations).
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have allowed LLCs to enjoy maximum use through the elimination of all technical
requirements to secure partnership classification. The ability of well-advised,
smaller businesses to obtain the LLC's benefits indirectly, combined with barriers
within the corporate tax system preventing the LLC from materially encroaching
on larger businesses,261 offers one explanation for Congress's and the IRS's lack of
interference after the LLC movement began. Another explanation looks to the
firestorm of criticism following the 1980 proposed regulations, which attempted to
require all business organizations offering statutory limited liability to bear the
corporate tax.2 62 Perhaps Congress and the IRS simply did not want to face the
political pressure that inevitably would have followed any wholesale attack on
LLCs in the 1990s.
Ultimately from the broadest perspective, the origins behind the LLC involve
the power of the individual states to experiment with business organizations
meshing with the conditions of the twentieth century, rendering it advantageous for
interest groups to harness this power in order to create and perfect the LLC.
Throughout U.S. legal history in the context of many areas, the phenomena of state
law experimentation and competition has always been a familiar part of the
relationship between the states and the federal government. Policy arguments both
praising and criticizing the substantive results generated from state law
experimentation and competition have addressed a variety of issues including the
early twentieth century development of corporation law.263 Whether or not the rise
of the LLC should be praised or criticized as a sound example of state
experimentation and competition raises a legitimate question within the broader
debate asking whether state versus federal regulation achieves the best results.
Because the LLC exposes and mitigates the inequities of the federal business tax
regime imposed on partnerships and corporations, a strong argument can be made
that the LLC represents a positive product resulting from the ability of the states to
create new business organizations.264
261 See Hamill, Corporate Integration, supra note 3, at 410-29.
2 62 See supra notes 34-35.
2 63 See supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text (discussing sources which praise and
criticize the results generated by the competition among the states to produce the best general
incorporation statute); see also Edward L. Rubin, The Fundamentality and Irrelevance of
Federalism, 13 GA. ST. L. REv. 1009, 1059-62 (1997); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley,
Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 910-14 (1994) (Using
a variety of regulatory issues as examples, Rubin argues that the real question behind the state
versus federal balance of power controversies looks to whether optimal policy results can be best
achieved through state experimentation and competition or federal regulation.); Harry N. Scheiber,
American Federalism and the Diffusion ofPower: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, 9
U. TOL. L. REv. 619 (1978) (reviewing balance of power between state and federal branches
throughout America's history).
2 64 See generally Hamill, Corporate Integration, supra note 3.
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Although the LLC won huge battles in the tax arena, its future viability will
largely revolve around business issues that pose a greater challenge to its ability to
survive as an independent business entity. The rise of the LLC has contributed
greatly to the spawning of several other unincorporated forms for doing business,
creating an unwieldy number of business entities from which to choose. The
presence of these new forms of business, including the limited liability partnership,
known as the LLP, and the limited liability limited partnership, known as the
LLLP, 265 also resulted because the individual states possess the power to create new
business organizations. Recently, a body of scholarship has appeared criticizing this
morass of choices as confusing and inefficient Some of these scholars argue for the
merger of all business entities into one form.266 The debate at the academic level
will intensify while practitioners continue to vote informally on which of these
entities offers the best alternative through their advice to business clients. The ability
of the states to experiment and create new business organizations, which made the
LLC's birth and initial success possible, may ultimately lead to the LLC's demise.
Having won the battle at the tax level, the LLC now faces the crucial war-can it
continue to survive as a distinct business form or will it disappear as part of a
unified business organization?
APPENDIX
To better understand the choice of business entity, the income tax burden bome
by individuals in partnerships and S corporations must be compared to the tax
burden bome by corporations. The amount of income tax paid by these entities
greatly influences the decision whether to incorporate. A simple analysis of the
individual income tax rate versus the corporate tax rate, however, is not an adequate
measure of the true tax burden borne by these groups. Because of the presence of
265 See Robert W. Hamilton, RegisteredLimited Liability Partnerships: PresentAt The Birth
(Nearly), 66 CoLO. L. REv. 1065, 1065--66 (1995) (describing the impetus for Texas's enactment
of the first domestic LLP in 1991); see also ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBsTEIN,
BROMBFRG AND RIBsmiN ON PARTNERSHIP § 1.01(bX5) (1997) (noting that following Texas's
LLP statute a number of additional states added LLP provisions to their partnership statutes);
Robert R. Keatinge, Corporations, Unincorporated Organizations and Unincorporations: Check
the Box and the Balkanization ofBusiness Organizations, 1 J. oF SMALL & EmEGING Bus. LAW
201,206 (noting that the types of business entities have grown dramatically since 1988 including
the LLC, LLP, and the LLLP).
2 66 See John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olsen, A Call For a Unified Business Organization
Law, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 30-48 (1996); Dale A. Osterle & Wayne M. Gazur, What's in a
Name? An Argument For a Small Business "Limited Liability Entity" Statute (With Three Sets of
Default Rules), 32 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 101 (1997). For an earlier argument along this same
theme, see Harry Haynsworth, The Need For a Unified Small Business Structure, 33 Bus. LAW.
849(1978).
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certain tax preferences and deductions available to individuals and corporations, the
nominal income tax rates do not reflect the "actual" tax burden borne by each group.
The best approach in this regard is to subtract these preferences and deductions from
the income tax rates in order to derive the "effective" income tax rate paid by
individuals and corporations. These effective income tax rates are superior
indicators of the actual income tax burdens being borne by individuals and
corporations and therefore provide a more accurate picture of the precise factors
affecting the choice of business entity.
For the purposes of this Article, the methods for calculating the effective
income tax rates are noted below. It should be noted, however, that due to
differences in the historical reporting techniques by the Treasury
Department/Internal Revenue Service throughout the period covered, fluctuations
in the effective rates are partly caused by the inconsistent reporting techniques.
These differences are evident in our formulas for calculating the effective tax rates.
For the years 1913 to 1915 and 1954 to 1992, the effective rate for individuals
was derived by dividing "income taxes paid after credits" by "adjusted gross
income." For the years 1916 to 1953, the effective rate was provided in Statistics of
Income. The effective rate for corporations from 1913 to 1957 was derived by
dividing "income taxes paid after all credits except the foreign tax credit" by "net
income." The effective rate for corporations from 1958 to 1992 was derived by
dividing "income taxes paid after all credits except the foreign tax credit" by
"income subject to tax." The effective rate for corporations from 1958-1992 was
derived by dividing "income taxes paid after all credits except the foreign tax credit"
by "income subject to tax." The corporate effective rates do not factor in the foreign
tax credit in order to accurately reflect the true tax burden. Because both the "net
income" and "income subject to tax" figures include worldwide income,
inconsistency is achieved by including worldwide taxes.
In addition, war profits and/or excess profit tax rates imposed on corporations
are not included in our nominal tax rate figures. However, the revenue produced by
these taxes was added to the corporate "income taxes paid" figure in computing the
effective tax rates. Therefore, for the years in which either one or both of these taxes
were imposed, it is difficult to measure the degree to which corporations
successfully reduced their nominal rates through tax planning. Additionally, because
the nominal income tax rates did not include these taxes, the war profits and excess
profits taxes had the effect in some years of "creating" higher effective tax rates than
the nominal tax rates. The years in which the war profits tax and or the excess
profits tax was imposed includes 1917 to 1922, 1933 to 1946, and 1950 to 1954.
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